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ABSTRACT—Critics of the Obama Administration’s decision not to defend
the Defense of Marriage Act argued that the President had a “duty to
defend” the law and that the Executive Branch should serve as Congress’s
agent in defending statutes in court. Both propositions are wrong. First, it
does not make sense to think of the Executive Branch as Congress’s agent
because, in the context of government action, there are multiple and
changing principals and the Executive Branch is at once both principal and
agent. Second, the President does not have an absolute duty to defend
statutes in court. Proponents of the duty to defend argue that defense of the
law is part of the President’s constitutional obligation to take care that the
laws are faithfully executed and that it is untoward for the government to
speak with more than one voice in court. This Article argues that defense is
distinct from execution, and that in some contexts, it is helpful for the
government to speak with more than one voice. The Article then argues that
where the Executive Branch has questions about a statute’s
constitutionality, it should not defend the law because nondefense better
serves our adversarial system of justice and better enables the Executive
Branch to protect its own interests. Moreover, where the Executive Branch
does not defend, Congress or court-appointed counsel can do so in its place.
Finally, this Article suggests that recognizing that classic principal–agent
principles do not apply to executive branch action may have implications
for other contexts.
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INTRODUCTION
Every day in different forums and contexts around the world,
individuals and entities act on behalf of the “United States.” Generally, such
actions are uncontroversial and should be so—these individuals and entities
are faithfully acting on behalf of the “United States” to execute the nation’s
laws and policies. It is natural to think of these executive branch
representatives as simple agents, implementing law and policy developed
by a distinct principal. But the Executive Branch is no simple agent,1 and,
even if it were, there is generally no distinct principal capable of providing
sustained control over its actions.2 In other words, classic principal–agent
principles do not work well in the context of executive branch action. That
fact may have important implications for how we think about executive
branch action in many contexts,3 but this Article focuses on one such
1

See infra notes 137‒43 and accompanying text. Although the Executive Branch is often
responsible for acting on behalf of the “United States” as a whole, it also must exercise its own
constitutional obligations. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (providing that the President “shall take Care that
the Laws be faithfully executed”).
2
See infra notes 123‒33 and accompanying text.
3
See infra Part V.
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context—the Executive Branch’s so-called “duty to defend” challenged
statutes.
By statute, “the conduct of litigation in which the United States, an
agency, or officer thereof is a party, or is interested” is, with certain
limitations, “reserved to officers of the Department of Justice,”4 and United
States attorneys are directed to “prosecute for all offenses against the
United States; [and] prosecute or defend, for the Government, all civil
actions, suits or proceedings in which the United States is concerned” that
arise in their districts.5 These statutes are commonly understood to confer
upon the Department of Justice (DOJ or Department) and other federal
lawyers the responsibility to serve as the United States’ agents in court.
Generally, such assumptions of simple agency are, even if incomplete, also
unproblematic; there is generally little controversy about the actions the
DOJ takes (or fails to take) in the name of the “United States.” But
sometimes there is.
Earlier this year, the DOJ announced that it would no longer defend the
Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA),6 which defines the word “marriage” for
purposes of federal law to mean “only a legal union between one man and
one woman as husband and wife.”7 The Department explained that the
President had concluded that the statute was unconstitutional and thus,
despite the “longstanding practice of defending the constitutionality of
duly-enacted statutes if reasonable arguments can be made in their
defense,” this was the “rare case” in which defense was not appropriate.8
Although gay rights proponents celebrated the decision, many others
condemned the Obama Administration. These critics of the Administration
made two related arguments. First, they argued that the President has a duty
to defend challenged statutes in court and that President Obama abdicated

4

28 U.S.C. § 516 (2006).
Id. § 547(1)‒(2).
6
Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006), 28 U.S.C. § 1738C).
7
1 U.S.C. § 7.
8
Letter from Eric H. Holder, Jr., Attorney Gen., to John A. Boehner, Speaker, U.S. House of
Representatives 5 (Feb. 23, 2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/February/11-ag223.html. Prior to that announcement, the Obama Administration had been defending DOMA in court
and had been criticized for doing so. See, e.g., Paul Hogarth, Obama’s DOMA Defense Unacceptable,
HUFFINGTON POST (June 15, 2009, 12:49 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/paul-hogarth/obamasdoma-defense-unacc_b_215718.html (criticizing the Administration for “advanc[ing] legal arguments
that—if pursued by the courts—could greatly damage gay and lesbian rights”). Earlier in the
Administration, the President and his advisers also confronted the question whether to defend in court
the ban on openly gay men and women serving in the military. See 10 U.S.C. § 654 (2006). In that case,
“the Obama administration’s Justice Department . . . continued with appeals, saying [it was] bound by a
‘duty to defend’ the laws even if it [did not] like them.” Devin Dwyer, “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell”: Is
Obama Administration Bound to Defend Law It Opposes?, ABC NEWS (Oct. 21, 2010), http://
abcnews.go.com/Politics/dont-debate-obama-administrations-legal-defense-gay-ban/story?id=11928405.
5
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this responsibility when he abandoned DOMA’s defense.9 According to
these critics, the President’s decision laid the groundwork for subsequent
presidents to abandon the legal defense of statutes with which they disagree
as a matter of policy. For example, one prominent law professor who
opposes DOMA nonetheless criticized the Administration for declining to
defend it, arguing that the Administration’s decision “sets a terrible
precedent that could well come back to haunt those who are cheering the
president’s decision.”10 Second, they argued that the Executive Branch was
ignoring its proper role vis-à-vis Congress. Specifically, they argued that
the Executive Branch’s proper role in defending legislation is that of
Congress’s agent, and that the only way it could be a faithful agent was to
defend the legislation. One commentator, for example, argued that the
Administration’s decision “changes the role of the Executive branch in
defending litigation from the traditional dutiful servant of Congress to
major institutional player with a great deal of discretion.”11
Neither of these criticisms is persuasive. First, although commentators
have long invoked the idea that the Executive Branch has a duty to defend
challenged statutes, no one has ever meaningfully explained precisely what
that duty is or where it comes from. There may be a reason for this.
9

See, e.g., Newt Gingrich Discusses Potential Obama Impeachment, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 25,
2011, 6:42 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/02/25/newt-gingrich-obama-impeachmentpalin_n_828506.html (“House Republicans . . . should pass a resolution instructing the president to
enforce the law and to obey his own constitutional oath, and they should say if he fails to do so that they
will zero out [defund] the office of attorney general and take other steps as necessary until the president
agrees to do his job.” (alteration in original) (quoting former Speaker of the House and Republican
presidential candidate Newt Gingrich)).
10
Adam Winkler, Why Obama Is Wrong on DOMA, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 24, 2011, 12:01 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/adam-winkler/why-obama-is-wrong-on-dom_b_827676.html (“Don’t be
surprised if a President Palin points to Obama’s decision when announcing her refusal to enforce and
defend the landmark healthcare reform law because, in her view, the individual mandate is
unconstitutional.”). Although I focus in this Article on the federal government, this issue arises at the
state level as well. Most recently, the litigation surrounding Proposition 8, the California ballot initiative
that overturned an earlier California Supreme Court decision recognizing a right to same-sex marriage
under the California Constitution, gave rise to the same questions about the Executive Branch’s
responsibility to defend the constitutionality of challenged statutes. See In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d
384, 401 (Cal. 2008). In that case, then-Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger and then-Attorney General
Edmund Gerald Brown decided not to defend the Proposition and, like President Obama, were subject to
both praise and criticism for their decision. See generally Vikram David Amar, Lessons from
California’s Recent Experience with Its Non-Unitary (Divided) Executive: Of Mayors, Governors,
Controllers, and Attorneys General, 59 EMORY L.J. 469 (2009) (discussing Attorney General Brown’s
decision not to defend Proposition 8 and asking whether there are lessons in that decision for the federal
government). And in Wisconsin, Governor Scott Walker told the courts that he could no longer defend
the state’s domestic partner registry because he believed it was unconstitutional. See Todd Richmond,
Walker: Domestic Partner Law Is Unconstitutional, WIS. L.J. (May 16, 2011, 9:14 PM), http://
wislawjournal.com/2011/05/16/walker-domestic-partner-law-is-unconstitutional/.
11
Orin Kerr, The Executive Power Grab in the Decision Not to Defend DOMA, VOLOKH
CONSPIRACY (Feb. 23, 2011, 3:49 PM), http://volokh.com/2011/02/23/the-executive-power-grab-in-thedecision-not-to-defend-doma/.
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Although it is almost certainly prudent for the DOJ to generally defend
challenged statutes, it is not at all clear that it has a duty to do so in all
circumstances, and the principal justifications for such a duty do not
support its existence. Some commentators have assumed that because the
Executive Branch is responsible for enforcing the law,12 it must be
responsible for defending it as well.13 But as I argue below, there are
meaningful differences between enforcement and defense, and a duty to do
the former does not necessarily imply a duty to do the latter. There also
seems to be a deep-seated belief that the United States should speak with
“one voice” in court. Chief Justice Roberts recently gave vivid expression
to this belief, explaining that the “difference between a suit against the State
brought by a private party and one brought by a state agency . . . is the
difference between eating and cannibalism; between murder and
patricide.”14 But it is unclear why this should be. When different parts of the
government have competing views—as they inevitably will—there is no
reason why the DOJ should have the exclusive authority to determine what
the government’s position will be in court. Rather, it makes sense to allow
different parts of the government to present their views and to let the courts,
which are supposed to be the final arbiters of the constitutionality of federal
statutes, determine which is right.15
Second, the Executive Branch cannot be—and should not be—simply
Congress’s dutiful agent. Indeed, there are meaningful limits to what simple
principal–agent principles can teach us when applied to executive branch
12

See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3; see also Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985) (“[A]n
agency’s refusal to institute proceedings shares to some extent the characteristics of the decision of a
prosecutor in the Executive Branch not to indict—a decision which has long been regarded as the special
province of the Executive Branch, inasmuch as it is the Executive who is charged by the Constitution to
‘take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.’” (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3)). See generally
James Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial Power, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1521, 1523 (1981)
(examining “the nature, scope, and effects of prosecutorial power” and arguing against “its present
expanded form”).
13
See infra Part II.C.
14
Va. Office for Prot. & Advocacy v. Stewart, 131 S. Ct. 1632, 1649 (2011) (Roberts, C.J.,
dissenting).
15
See, e.g., Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) (“[Marbury v. Madison] declared the basic
principle that the federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution, and that
principle has ever since been respected by this Court and the Country as a permanent and indispensable
feature of our constitutional system.”); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (“It is
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”); see also City of
Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 516 (1997) (reaffirming the “judicial authority to determine the
constitutionality of laws, in cases and controversies”). To be sure, there is substantial debate within the
academic community about whether the judiciary should play this role, see infra note 162, but
“[j]udicial supremacy has been, to an increasing degree over time, the practice for the better part of the
two centuries since Marbury,” Dale Carpenter, Judicial Supremacy and Its Discontents, 20 CONST.
COMMENT. 405, 422 (2003). I therefore take as my starting point the assumption that the courts are the
final expositors of constitutional meaning. But this position nonetheless allows for the Executive Branch
to develop and advance—within limits—its own interpretation of the Constitution.
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action. Recognizing these limits may have broad implications for how we
think about executive branch action in many contexts, but it also offers
specific lessons about the role of the Executive Branch in defending
challenged statutes. First, in the context of executive branch action, the
absence of a single principal and the existence of intertemporal
complications mean that there will often be situations in which there is no
principal capable of exercising sustained control over the agent’s actions. In
other words, the Congress and the President that enacted a law at t1 may not
be around to direct its execution (or provide checks against its misexecution) at t2.16 In the duty-to-defend context, these lessons remind us that
we cannot necessarily assume that the current Executive Branch and
Congress will be inclined to defend a law enacted by a previous Executive
Branch and Congress.17 Second, the Executive Branch is at once both
principal and agent. The Executive Branch plays a role in the enactment of
legislation through the presentment process, and its various agencies are
generally supposed to make substantive policy through the broad
delegations of power they are granted. The Executive Branch is thus
supposed to have its own institutional views and interests, at least in some
cases. Recognizing these facts helps make clear that the Executive Branch
is not simply Congress’s agent, and it should not defend challenged statutes
for that reason.
This does not mean that the Executive Branch should never defend
challenged statutes or even that it should rarely do so. My point is only that
it need not always do so and that we should think critically about the
circumstances in which executive nondefense is preferable to executive
defense. In the remainder of this Article, I argue that the Obama
Administration was correct not to defend DOMA because the Executive
Branch should not defend challenged statutes when it believes that the
statute is unconstitutional, or even has questions about the statute’s
constitutionality. By Executive Branch, I mean the President or DOJ
attorneys in cases in which the President is not personally involved.
Although there are many interesting questions about the internal dynamics
16

See, e.g., Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 HARV.
L. REV. 2312, 2359 (2006) (“[I]f there is a problem with sweeping delegations, it would seem to be
primarily a matter of time inconsistency. Patterns of party control change periodically, but many broad
delegations passed under unified government stay in effect indefinitely, until the statutes are revised or
repealed.”).
17
It seems certain, for example, that a Democrat-controlled House would have declined to defend
DOMA. See, e.g., Felicia Sonmez & Ben Pershing, Boehner Moves to Defend Gay-Marriage Ban,
WASH. POST, Mar. 5, 2011, at A2 (quoting House Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi as saying, “I oppose
Speaker Boehner’s effort to put the House in the position of defending this indefensible statute.”).
Indeed, when the House Bipartisan Legal Advisory Committee voted to defend the statute, the measure
passed by a 3–2 party-line vote. See Letter from Rep. Nancy Pelosi, Democratic House Leader, to Rep.
John Boehner, Speaker of the House, U.S. House of Representatives (Mar. 11, 2011), available at http://
pelosi.house.gov/news/press-releases/2011/03/pelosi-letter-to-speaker-boehner-on-house-counseldefense-of-doma.shtml.
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by which the Executive Branch determines its legal views on questions,18 I
here assume that the Executive Branch has a settled view that is consistent
with the views of the President and his political appointees.19
My position will, of course, seem unexceptionable to those who
believe that the Executive Branch is an equal and independent interpreter of
the Constitution, free to act on its own views of the Constitution, whatever
the courts might have to say.20 If the Executive Branch need not enforce
statutes that it believes are unconstitutional, it certainly need not defend
them. But one need not agree that the Executive Branch is free to disregard
the dictates of the courts to think that it can—and should—sometimes
decline to defend the constitutionality of challenged statutes in court.
Indeed, I start from the premise that the courts are the final arbiters of
constitutional questions,21 and I argue that executive nondefense may
actually facilitate, rather than undermine, judicial resolution of disputes.
After all, where the Executive Branch has questions about a statute’s
constitutionality, entrusting it to be the United States’ agent in court may
undermine the purposes normally served by our adversarial system of
justice. Whatever the imperfections of that system,22 our commitment to
adversarialism reflects a long-held belief that competing parties will
facilitate the courts’ search for truth and their ability to reach the best legal
outcome, and our system’s commitment to adversarialism means that it
relies in substantial part on adversarial parties. If the purported proponent of
the statute does not actually believe that it is constitutional and is unwilling
18

There are, for example, interesting questions about the internal processes by which conflicts
within the Executive Branch are resolved and what role the President should or must play in those
conflicts. There are also interesting questions about whether the DOJ should consider anew the
constitutionality of every statute it is called upon to defend or whether it should instead confer a
presumption of constitutionality on validly enacted legislation. If the latter, the question then becomes
how it should determine which statutes are selected for special review and what role, if any, the
President should or must play in that process. These are questions that I hope to take up in the future.
19
Cf., e.g., Daniel B. Rodriguez, Management, Control, and the Dilemmas of Presidential
Leadership in the Modern Administrative State, 43 DUKE L.J. 1180, 1194‒95 (1994) (“[T]he President
sits atop the regulatory system as the leader of the federal bureaucracy. If anyone is positioned to
coordinate diffuse regulatory policy, it is the President, as leader of the executive branch.”); George F.
Fraley, III, Note, Is the Fox Watching the Henhouse?: The Administration’s Control of FEC Litigation
Through the Solicitor General, 9 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 1215, 1233 (1996) (“The Solicitor General is
appointed by the President who is likely to select a candidate with similar political and philosophical
views.”).
20
See infra note 162 and accompanying text. Indeed, relying in part on this view, Neal Devins and
Saikrishna Prakash have recently argued that the executive branch has no duty either to defend or
enforce challenged laws. See Neal Devins & Saikrishna Prakash, The Indefensible Duty to Defend,
112 COLUM. L. REV. 507, 509 (2012).
21
See infra notes 162‒66 and accompanying text.
22
See, e.g., Amanda Frost, The Limits of Advocacy, 59 DUKE L.J. 447 (2009); Brianne J. Gorod,
The Adversarial Myth: Appellate Court Extra-Record Factfinding, 61 DUKE L.J. 1 (2011); Brian P.
Goldman, Note, Should the Supreme Court Stop Inviting Amici Curiae to Defend Abandoned Lower
Court Decisions?, 63 STAN. L. REV. 907 (2011).
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to make the strongest arguments in support of its constitutionality, it
undermines that system and the benefits it is supposed to promote.
To be sure, attorneys often offer zealous arguments in support of
positions with which they disagree. But the DOJ is not the same as private
counsel, hired solely to promote the interests of a client. As noted above,
the Executive Branch will often have its own legal views, and it should be
able to present those views in court to ensure the courts have the benefit of
the Executive Branch’s most considered legal views, to ensure the public
knows what the Executive Branch’s views are, and to preserve the
Executive Branch’s institutional relationship with the courts.
In the absence of executive defense, a statute need not—and should
not—go undefended; it should be defended either by Congress or by outside
counsel appointed by the courts. After all, the United States still has an
interest in seeing its law defended. The point is simply that the Executive
Branch need not be the one defending it.
Recognizing that there will sometimes be complications in asking the
Executive Branch to act as agent for the whole also suggests a need to give
more sustained thought to other contexts in which complications may arise
because the Executive Branch—one component part of the United States—
is supposed to act as agent for the whole. The “United States” is, after all,
many different things in different contexts: it is the Executive Branch; it is
the Congress; it is the Judiciary; it is “We the People.” It is even
governments that have acted in the past. In different contexts, these
component parts—alone or in combination—operate to determine what the
law and policy of the “United States” should be. And although it necessarily
falls to some subset of those parts to act on behalf of the whole, too little
attention has been paid to the problems that this reality can present,
including the danger that the Executive Branch may arrogate power to itself
by purporting to act on behalf of the whole even when it has no authority to
do so. The specific questions raised by executive branch action (or inaction)
will vary across contexts, but a general lesson of the duty-to-defend
question—that simple principal–agent principles do not apply neatly to
executive branch action—may have larger lessons that extend beyond the
duty to defend.
In Part I, I provide some background on the Executive Branch’s role in
litigating for the United States in general and in defending challenged
statutes in particular. I then consider the first of the criticisms leveled
against the Obama Administration—the idea that the Executive Branch has
a duty to defend challenged statutes. I discuss the two most traditional
justifications for that duty and explain why, in my view, neither establishes
that the Executive Branch has an absolute duty to defend challenged
statutes in all circumstances.
In Part II, I turn to the other criticism leveled against the Obama
Administration—that the Executive Branch should act as simple agent for
Congress in the context of defending statutes in court. I begin by describing
1208
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the classic principal–agent relationship and then identify two reasons why
classic principal–agent principles do not work when applied to executive
branch action: (1) the existence of many and changing principals and (2) the
fact that the purported agent is both agent and principal. I then apply those
lessons to the duty-to-defend context.
Having concluded that the Executive Branch should not always defend
challenged statutes, I turn in Part III to the question of whether it ought to
do so when it has questions about the statute’s constitutionality. I argue that
it should not defend in such a circumstance because doing so threatens to
undermine our adversarial system and compromises the Executive Branch’s
ability to protect its own institutional interests. In Part IV, I suggest
alternative approaches to the executive defense of challenged statutes and
consider some objections to these alternatives. Most significantly, I
consider the danger that the United States’ laws will be left undefended. As
I explain, my approach does not give rise to that concern, but ameliorates it
by inviting more parties to take up the defense of challenged statutes when
the Executive Branch may not be in the best position to do so.
In Part V, I look beyond the duty to defend to the larger lessons that
controversy can teach us, particularly once we recognize the complications
inherent in applying classic principal–agent principles to executive branch
action. Specifically, we need to pay more attention to the complications that
can arise when a part of the United States is supposed to act as agent for the
much more complicated whole. Recognizing that fact does not tell us how
to address the potential conflicts that may arise in different contexts, but it
does at least ensure that we are asking the right questions.
I. THE “DUTY TO DEFEND”
The Executive Branch and, more specifically, the DOJ, have long been
charged with acting for the United States in the defense of challenged
statutes, just as they generally act for the United States in most litigation.
Traditionally, the Executive Branch has declined to defend the
constitutionality of statutes in only very limited circumstances: where the
President concluded that the statute was unconstitutional,23 where it was
clearly unconstitutional under existing Supreme Court precedent,24 or where
“the statute . . . infringe[d] on the constitutional power of the Executive.”25
The Executive Branch has also maintained that “a President may decline to
defend a statute where no ‘respectable’ [or ‘reasonable’] argument can be

23

See, e.g., Chrysanthe Gussis, Note, The Constitution, the White House, and the Military HIV Ban:
A New Threshold for Presidential Non-Defense of Statutes, 30 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 591, 607 (1997).
24
See, e.g., id. at 608 (discussing President Kennedy’s decision not to defend “a separate-but-equal
provision of a law that provided federal funding for racially segregated hospitals”).
25
The Attorney General’s Duty to Defend the Constitutionality of Statutes, 43 Op. Att’y Gen. 325,
325 (1981).
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advanced in its support.”26 The standard is supposed to be a stringent one,
and although the Executive Branch has carefully preserved its authority not
to defend challenged statutes, it has also consistently acknowledged a
general duty to do so.27
It was this duty that critics of the Obama Administration’s DOMA
decision used to challenge the President’s claim that the DOJ could
properly decline to defend a statute that the President believed to be
unconstitutional. But although the Executive Branch and commentators
have long acknowledged the Executive Branch’s duty to defend challenged
statutes, the precise scope and source of this duty has never been clear. In
this Part, after providing some background on the Executive Branch’s role
as the United States’ agent in court and the circumstances in which the duty
to defend can arise, I examine this so-called duty and argue that neither of
the two principal justifications for such a duty support its existence.
A. Executive Branch as the United States
Since the Judiciary Act of 1789, the Executive Branch has been tasked
with the appointment of “person[s] learned in the law to act as attorney[s]
for the United States.”28 In 1870, the DOJ was established “to eliminate the
reliance on private lawyers in litigation” and “to centralize the [Executive
Branch’s] counseling function.”29 Although the goals of centralization were
not fully realized then, they came to fruition with the New Deal when “the
modern framework was put in place.”30 At that point, President Roosevelt
issued an executive order that “transferred to the Department of Justice”
“functions of prosecuting in the courts of the United States claims and
demands by, and offenses against, the Government of the United States and
of defending claims and demands against the Government, and of

26

Gussis, supra note 23, at 610.
In letters to the Senate Legal Counsel advising the Senate that the DOJ would not be defending a
statute in court, “Attorney General Griffin Bell closed his letters with the following statement: ‘The
Department of Justice is, of course, fully mindful of its duty to support the laws enacted by Congress.
Here, however, the Department has determined, after careful study and deliberation, that reasonable
arguments cannot be advanced to defend the challenged statute.’” Drew S. Days III, Lecture, In Search
of the Solicitor General’s Clients: A Drama with Many Characters, 83 KY. L.J. 485, 503 (1995)
(quoting Letter from Attorney Gen. Griffin Bell to Sen. Robert Byrd 2 (May 8, 1979)).
28
1 Stat. 73, 92 (1789). The Judiciary Act also created the office of “attorney-general for the United
States, . . . whose duty it shall be to prosecute and conduct all suits in the Supreme Court in which the
United States shall be concerned.” Id. at 93.
29
Neal Devins & Michael Herz, The Uneasy Case for Department of Justice Control of Federal
Litigation, 5 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 558, 559‒60 (2003) (emphasis omitted).
30
Id. at 559‒60 (noting that the Executive Branch’s management of the United States’ litigation
remained “diffuse and decentralized” until the twentieth century).
27
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supervising the work of United States attorneys, marshals, and clerks in
connection therewith.”31
Today, “the conduct of litigation in which the United States, an
agency, or officer thereof is a party, or is interested . . . is reserved to
officers of the Department of Justice.”32 The DOJ carries out these
responsibilities under the auspices of the Attorney General, who is given
the responsibility to “supervise all litigation to which the United States, an
agency, or officer thereof is a party”33 and the power to send “[t]he Solicitor
General, or any officer of the Department of Justice . . . to any State or
district in the United States to attend to the interests of the United States in
a suit pending in a court of the United States, or in a court of a State, or to
attend to any other interest of the United States.”34 As the Supreme Court
has explained, the Attorney General “is the hand of the President in taking
care that the laws of the United States in protection of the interests of the
United States in legal proceedings and in the prosecution of offences, be
faithfully executed.”35
Central to the contemporary mission of the DOJ is the “defen[se] [of]
the interests of the United States according to the law.”36 By virtue of this
statutory responsibility, the DOJ employs thousands of attorneys to
represent the “United States” at all levels of the federal judicial system.37 In
some cases, the “United States” begins as a named party, prosecuting the
accused or defending against a legal claim; in others, the “United States”
technically begins as a stranger to the case, but intervenes to protect its
interests;38 and finally, in still others, the United States never formally
becomes a party, but nonetheless shares its views with the court as an
amicus.39
31

Exec. Order No. 6166, § 5 (1933), reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C. § 901 (2006). President
Wilson had earlier made a similar attempt, “but the change was largely ineffective and, in any event,
temporary.” Neal Devins & Michael Herz, The Battle that Never Was: Congress, the White House, and
Agency Litigation Authority, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 205, 207 n.8 (1998).
32
28 U.S.C. § 516 (2006). The statute does provide that other statutory provisions may trump this
reservation in particular cases. See id.
33
Id. § 519.
34
Id. § 517.
35
Ponzi v. Fessenden, 258 U.S. 254, 262 (1922); see also Devins & Herz, supra note 29, at 560 (“In
general, then, the Department of Justice is the litigator for the United States and its administrative
agencies. Agencies may not employ outside counsel for litigation and must refer all matters to DOJ.”
(footnote omitted)).
36
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE OVERVIEW 1 (2011), available at http://
www.justice.gov/jmd/2012summary/pdf/fy12-bud-summary-request-performance.pdf.
37
See id. at 3.
38
See § 2403(a) (allowing the United States to intervene to defend the constitutionality of a federal
statute).
39
See, e.g., Omari Scott Simmons, Picking Friends from the Crowd: Amicus Participation as
Political Symbolism, 42 CONN. L. REV. 185, 213 (2009) (“Today, as much as forty-five percent of the
Solicitor General’s argumentation is through amicus submission.”).
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Whatever its point of entry, the Executive Branch’s influence on
judicial decisionmaking is often significant. It may be the “province and
duty of the judicial department to say what the law is,”40 but the Executive
Branch often plays a significant role in helping the judiciary make that
determination.41 Executive branch lawyers appearing in federal courts
throughout the judicial system facilitate courts’ resolution of disputes by
providing what are purportedly the United States’ views on a variety of
issues, ranging from fine questions of statutory interpretation to significant
questions of constitutional law, and identifying the potential consequences
that might result from the courts’ decisions.42
B. The Duty to Defend
Although commentators generally suggest that the duty to defend is a
monolithic concept, a fixed obligation of the Executive Branch that always
arises in exactly the same way and carries with it exactly the same
responsibilities, there are at least three different contexts in which the duty
to defend arises.
1. The Trial Court.—When a lawsuit is filed that challenges the
constitutionality of a statute, the government and government officials will
often be named as defendants.43 In such cases, the government has an
obligation to file an answer or otherwise respond to the lawsuit, lest it lose
the case by default. In such cases, defending the statute will be an inevitable
part of the general defense of the lawsuit, and it is at this stage of the
litigation that the Executive Branch will generally lay the foundation for
defending the statute’s constitutionality, compiling the factual evidence and

40

Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
See Todd Lochner, Note, The Relationship Between the Office of Solicitor General and the
Independent Agencies: A Reevaluation, 79 VA. L. REV. 549, 561 (1993) (“By far the most frequent amici
before the Court, the United States is also one of the most successful. On average, the Office wins
seventy-five percent of the cases in which it participates as amicus curiae . . . .” (footnote omitted)).
42
Cf. Margaret Meriwether Cordray & Richard Cordray, The Solicitor General’s Changing Role in
Supreme Court Litigation, 51 B.C. L. REV. 1323, 1338 (2010) (“[T]he Solicitor General’s participation
in the Supreme Court’s docket has become nearly pervasive. . . . [T]he Solicitor General has been
participating in seventy-five percent of the merits cases since the mid-1990s, though increasingly in
cases where the government itself is not a party.”); Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The
Influence of Amicus Curiae Briefs on the Supreme Court, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 743, 782 (2000) (“[T]he
interests of the executive branch and of Congress are nearly always represented in the Supreme Court by
the Solicitor General . . . .”).
43
See, e.g., Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 656 F.3d 253 (4th Cir. 2011) (Commonwealth of
Virginia suing the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services to challenge federal
health care reform); United States v. Arizona, 641 F.3d 339 (9th Cir. 2011), aff’d in part 132 S. Ct. 2492
(2012) (U.S. DOJ suing the State of Arizona to challenge Arizona’s controversial immigration statute).
41
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legal arguments that will enable it to make the strongest possible case for
the statute’s constitutionality.44
The Obama Administration’s decision not to defend DOMA arose at
just this stage in the litigation in cases in the Southern District of New York
and the District of Connecticut.45 Although the DOJ had previously
defended the statute,46 it explained that it had done so in jurisdictions in
which there was binding precedent holding that laws that discriminate on
the basis of sexual orientation are only subject to rational basis review.47
The Second Circuit, by contrast, did not have such precedent,48 and the
Department and the President determined that such laws should be subject
to heightened scrutiny and that DOMA was unconstitutional when subject
to that scrutiny.49
Thus, while recognizing that “the Department has a longstanding
practice of defending the constitutionality of duly-enacted statutes if
reasonable arguments can be made in their defense,” the Department
explained that “[t]his is the rare case where the proper course is to forgo the
defense of this statute.”50 The Department offered two possible explanations
for its decision, but did not make clear whether both were necessary. First,
it noted that “the Department in the past has declined to defend statutes
despite the availability of professionally responsible arguments, in part
because the Department does not consider every plausible argument to be a
‘reasonable’ one.”51 Second, it noted that “the Department has declined to
defend a statute ‘in cases in which it is manifest that the President has
concluded that the statute is unconstitutional,’ as is the case here.”52
At the end of his letter to the Speaker of the House, the Attorney
General advised that “[a] motion to dismiss in the [relevant] cases would be

44

Although the trial court is supposed to establish the factual record on which the case will be
decided, that is often not the case. See Gorod, supra note 22, at 28‒35.
45
See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Pedersen v. Office of Pers. Mgmt.. No.
3:10-cv-01750-VLB (D. Conn. Nov. 9, 2010); Complaint, Windsor v. United States, No. 10-cv-8435
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 9, 2010).
46
See, e.g., Gill v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 699 F. Supp. 2d 374 (D. Mass. 2010), aff’d sub nom.
Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 682 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2012).
47
See Letter from Eric H. Holder, Jr., Attorney Gen., to John A. Boehner, Speaker, U.S. House of
Representatives, supra note 8, at 1–2 (“Previously, the Administration has defended [DOMA] Section 3
in jurisdictions where circuit courts have already held that classifications based on sexual orientation are
subject to rational basis review, and it has advanced arguments to defend DOMA Section 3 under the
binding standard that has applied in those cases.”).
48
See id. at 2 (“These new lawsuits, by contrast, will require the Department to take an affirmative
position on the level of scrutiny that should be applied to DOMA Section 3 in a circuit without binding
precedent on the issue.”).
49
See id.
50
Id. at 5.
51
Id.
52
Id. (quoting Seth P. Waxman, Defending Congress, 79 N.C. L. REV. 1073, 1083 (2001)).
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due on March 11, 2011,”53 so that Congress could continue defending the
statute if it were inclined to do so. It was. Just days before the motion to
dismiss was due, the House (specifically, the House’s Bipartisan Leadership
Advisory Group, by a 3–2 party-line vote) decided to fill the vacuum
created by the Department’s decision not to defend the statute.54 The House
Speaker explained that “[t]he constitutionality of this law should be
determined by the courts—not by the president unilaterally—and this action
by the House will ensure the matter is addressed in a manner consistent
with our Constitution.”55 The House’s retained counsel (a former Solicitor
General then in private practice56) thus assumed responsibility for
developing the record and legal arguments that the courts will use to
determine the constitutionality of DOMA.
2. On Appeal.—If the Executive Branch had continued to defend
DOMA in the district courts, its obligation to defend the statute would not
necessarily have come to an end when the district court cases did. The duty
to defend arguably also includes the obligation to appeal adverse trial court
decisions to appellate courts and to petition the Supreme Court to grant
certiorari in cases where there is an adverse decision in the courts of
appeals. After all, in the absence of such an appeal, the challenged law is, at
least for some purposes and in some places, void.
But some commentators have suggested that there may not be a duty to
appeal, even if there is a duty to defend in the trial court. Former Solicitor
General Ted Olson, for example, has suggested that the Executive Branch

53

Id. at 6 (“Our attorneys will also notify the courts of our interest in providing Congress a full and
fair opportunity to participate in the litigation in those cases.”).
54
See Molly K. Hooper, House Leaders Vote to Intervene in DOMA Defense, THE HILL (Mar. 9,
2011, 6:43 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-room/news/148521-house-leaders-vote-tointervene-in-doma-defense (“In a party-line vote of 3-2, the five-member BLAG . . . gave the House
general counsel the authority to retain outside counsel to defend the Defense of Marriage Act
(DOMA).”); see also Carolyn Lochhead, Nancy Pelosi Asks John Boehner How Much DOMA Litigation
Will Cost, SFGATE POLITICSBLOG (Mar. 11, 2011, 12:46 PM), http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/blogs/
nov05election/detail?entry_id=84843#ixzz1GgMd92ov (“The American people want Congress to be
working on the creation of jobs and ensuring the continued progress of our economic recovery rather
than involving itself unnecessarily in such costly and divisive litigation.” (quoting Rep. Nancy Pelosi
explaining her opposition to the House’s continued defense of the statute)).
55
Marcia Coyle, Boehner Says House Will Intervene to Support Defense of Marriage Act, BLT:
BLOG OF LEGALTIMES (Mar. 4, 2011, 4:09 PM), http://legaltimes.typepad.com/blt/2011/03/boehnersays-house-will-intervene-to-support-defense-of-marriage-act.html (quoting Rep. John Boehner).
56
See, e.g., Amanda Terkel, DOMA Defense: Lawmakers Puzzled Where House GOP Is Getting the
Money to Pay Paul Clement, HUFFINGTON POST (May 13, 2011, 5:54 PM), http://
www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/05/13/doma-defense-gop-paul-clement_n_861548.html.
Clement’s
defense of the law became the subject of considerable controversy after his law firm, King & Spalding,
decided to withdraw from the litigation, and Clement in turn resigned from the firm. See, e.g., Ashby
Jones, After King & Spalding Drops DOMA Case, Clement Drops Firm, WALL ST. J.L. BLOG (Apr. 25,
2011, 12:09 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2011/04/25/after-king-spalding-drops-doma-case-clementdrops-firm/.
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could decide not to appeal an adverse trial court decision because there
would, at that point, be a judicial determination that the law is
unconstitutional. In the context of discussing the litigation surrounding
“Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” Olson maintained that “[i]t would be appropriate
for [the Government] to say ‘the law has been deemed unconstitutional, we
are not going to seek further review of that.’”57 Others have suggested that
the government can choose not to appeal where doing so is in the United
States’ long-term interests, either because success in the case is unlikely58 or
because appealing in that particular case might affect the government’s
“relationship with the Court.”59
In the context of deciding whether to petition for certiorari before the
Supreme Court, the government may also decide that “limiting the cases in
which review is sought” may make it “more likely to obtain plenary review
in those cases where it is most important.”60 For this reason, then-Assistant
Attorney General Rex Lee has distinguished between the duty to defend and
the duty to appeal, explaining that situations where the DOJ does not defend
a federal statute “should not be confused with situations in which the
Department defends the constitutionality of a statute unsuccessfully in
lower courts but does not seek an appeal.”61
3. Intervention.—The first two contexts in which the duty to defend
arises both involve situations in which the government itself is a named
defendant. But there are cases in which the constitutionality of a statute is at
issue and the government is nonetheless not a named party. In such cases,
57

Dwyer, supra note 8 (quoting Ted Olson).
See Cordray & Cordray, supra note 42, at 1329‒30 (“[T]he Solicitor General considers whether
the facts of a particular case present the issues and the government’s position favorably, how the case
will impact the long-term development of the law, whether the subject area will be of interest to the
Court, and whether the government will win on the merits.”); cf. Letter from Andrew W. Stroud,
Counsel for Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger, to the Honorable Ronald M. George, Chief Justice of the
Cal. Supreme Court 2 (Sept. 8, 2010), available at http://metroweekly.com/poliglot/2010/09/08/Gov
Letter Brief.pdf (“Litigation involves strategic decisions. The filing of a notice of appeal is one such
strategic decision.”).
59
Rex E. Lee, Lawyering for the Government: Politics, Polemics & Principle, 47 OHIO ST. L.J.
595, 598 (1986); see also infra Part III.C (discussing the Solicitor General’s special relationship with the
Court).
60
Representation of Congress and Congressional Interests in Court: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong. 6 (1975–1976)
[hereinafter Buckley Hearings] (statement of Rex E. Lee, Assistant Att’y Gen., Civil Div.); see also
Cordray & Cordray, supra note 42, at 1330 (“The Solicitor General also must prioritize, bringing only
the most important cases to the Court.”). It is admittedly a bit odd to suggest that the government might
ever view a decision holding a federal law unconstitutional as insufficiently significant to merit the
Supreme Court’s review. Indeed, the Supreme Court will generally grant certiorari in such
circumstances. See, e.g., Lynn A. Baker, Lochner’s Legacy for Modern Federalism: Pierce County v.
Guillen as a Case Study, 85 B.U. L. REV. 727, 733 (2005) (“Because the Washington Supreme Court
had held a federal statute unconstitutional, there was no question that the U.S. Supreme Court would
grant certiorari in the case.”).
61
Buckley Hearings, supra note 60, at 6.
58
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the government must decide whether to intervene to defend the statute’s
constitutionality.
At the federal level, the need for government intervention to defend the
constitutionality of statutes came to the fore during the New Deal when the
Supreme Court frequently struck down New Deal legislation, even in cases
between private parties in which the United States had no opportunity to
present its views.62 As a result, Congress enacted a statute which provided
that:
[W]here[] the constitutionality of any Act of Congress affecting the public
interest is drawn in question, the court shall certify such fact to the Attorney
General, and shall permit the United States to intervene for presentation of
evidence, if evidence is otherwise admissible in the case, and for argument on
the question of constitutionality.63

This statute has frequently provided the basis for government intervention.
For example, when two men who were sued for assault under the Violence
Against Women Act’s private right of action provision argued that
“Congress lacked constitutional authority to enact” that provision, the
Government intervened in the district court to defend the statute.64
The question of intervention is in some respects very different from the
two preceding questions. The government has not been called into court to
answer for the supposed problems with the statute, and the government
generally need not worry that the statute will go undefended if it does not
offer a defense. That said, few private litigants will wield the resources of
the federal government, and they may not be in the best position to provide
the strongest arguments in support of the statute’s constitutionality.
Moreover, private litigants will be primarily concerned about winning the
case; those interests may or may not coincide with defending fully the
constitutionality of the statute.
62

See, e.g., Arthur S. Miller & Jeffrey H. Bowman, Presidential Attacks on the Constitutionality of
Federal Statutes: A New Separation of Powers Problem, 40 OHIO ST. L.J. 51, 57 (1979) (“Particularly
vexatious to the President and Congress was that many of these decisions resulted from private suits in
which no one appeared on behalf of the government. Public policy was being made in those lawsuits,
which at times concerned only trivial matters for the litigants but had portentous consequences for the
nation.” (footnote omitted)); see also H.R. REP. NO. 75-212, at 2 (1937) (“The people generally, who
then become directly interested in and vitally affected by what otherwise would be a private lawsuit, are
entitled to have their representative appear with the right to present whatever evidence and argument
may be necessary fully to develop and adequately to present that issue to the court.”).
63
28 U.S.C. § 2403(a) (2006) (“The United States shall, subject to the applicable provisions of law,
have all the rights of a party and be subject to all liabilities of a party as to court costs to the extent
necessary for a proper presentation of the facts and law relating to the question of constitutionality.”).
The same statute provides that the state attorney general should similarly be notified where the
constitutionality of a state statute is called into question. See id. § 2403(b).
64
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 12, United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (No. 99-5);
see also Brzonkala v. Va. Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 132 F.3d 949, 956 (4th Cir. 1997) (“The
United States intervened to defend the constitutionality of VAWA.”).
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C. Justifications for the Duty to Defend
Although the idea that the Executive Branch has a duty to defend
challenged statutes is well-established, where this duty comes from is not.65
To the contrary, what little literature exists on the subject largely elides the
question. But the question is important because if there is not an absolute
duty to defend that exists in all contexts, then there is reason to question
whether it always makes sense for the Executive Branch to act as agent for
the whole in this context and, in particular, whether it makes sense for the
Executive Branch to defend challenged statutes where it has questions
about their constitutionality. The idea that there is a duty to defend seems to
rest upon two distinct premises: (1) that the Executive Branch’s
responsibility to enforce the law also includes a responsibility to defend it
and (2) that the United States should speak with one voice through the
Executive Branch.66
1. Enforcement  Defense.—This duty to defend challenged statutes
has been given to the Executive—and, more significantly, been viewed as
exclusively belonging to the Executive—because commentators have
assumed that the defense of statutes is no different than their enforcement.
For purposes of enforcing statutes, the Executive is essentially the “United
States.” Responsibility for the faithful execution of the laws is textually
committed to the President in the Constitution;67 indeed, it is fundamental to
the separation of powers that the Legislature does not participate in the
execution of the law.68 And the Executive Branch enjoys significant
discretion in determining how and when the laws of the United States
should be enforced. As the Supreme Court has recognized, “an agency’s
decision not to prosecute or enforce, whether through civil or criminal
process, is a decision generally committed to an agency’s absolute

65

Although “the conduct of litigation in which the United States, an agency, or officer thereof is a
party, or is interested . . . is reserved to officers of the Department of Justice,” § 516, this statutory
provision does not seem to impose an absolute duty on the Department to defend challenged statutes in
all circumstances.
66
There may also be less legally grounded motivations for advancing the idea that there is a duty to
defend. Neal Devins and Saikrishna Prakash argue that the concept of a duty to defend serves the selfinterests of the DOJ and, to a lesser extent, the White House. See Devins & Prakash, supra note 20, at
510‒11.
67
See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
68
See, e.g., Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 726‒27 (1986) (“To permit an officer controlled by
Congress to execute the laws would be, in essence, to permit a congressional veto. Congress could
simply remove, or threaten to remove, an officer for executing the laws in any fashion found to be
unsatisfactory to Congress. This kind of congressional control over the execution of the laws, Chadha
makes clear, is constitutionally impermissible.”); Joel K. Goldstein, The Presidency and the Rule of
Law: Some Preliminary Explorations, 43 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 791, 800 (1999) (“[T]he Constitution
imposes upon the President the obligation to administer law . . . through the Vesting Clause . . . [and] the
Take Care Clause.”).
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discretion.”69 There are, of course, modest limits to this authority,70 but it is
nonetheless the case that when the “United States” is enforcing its laws, it
is, in practice, the Executive Branch that is doing the enforcing.
Because responsibility for executing the law is committed to the
Executive Branch,71 commentators have assumed that responsibility for
defending the law is as well.72 They have assumed, in other words, that the
enforcement of statutes and the defense of statutes are both properly viewed
as species of executing the law. One court of appeals, for example, has
suggested that
[A statute] designat[ing] the Senate Legal Counsel, upon a separate resolution
of the Senate alone, to appear as the defender of all statutes on behalf of the
United States itself . . . might . . . trench on the prerogatives of the executive
branch of the United States, which has the authority to execute the laws of this
country.73

The Executive Branch itself has made this assumption. In an Attorney
General opinion from 1980 that provides one of the most extended
treatments of the Executive Branch’s duty to defend challenged statutes,
Attorney General Benjamin Civiletti treats the concepts of defense of the
law and execution of the law as virtually inseparable, referring repeatedly to
the Attorney General’s “duty to defend and enforce” constitutionally
objectionable legislation.74
Other commentators, too, have made the same assumption. Former
Solicitor General Kenneth Starr explained that when the constitutionality of
a statute was challenged, it “became our duty ‘in faithfully executing the

69

Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985); cf. In Moving KSM Trial, DOJ Blames Congress,
BLT: BLOG OF LEGALTIMES (Apr. 4, 2011, 1:50 PM), http://legaltimes.typepad.com/blt/2011/04/inmoving-ksm-trial-doj-blames-congress.html (citing Attorney General Holder as saying that “decisions
about where to prosecute belong in the executive branch of government”).
70
See, e.g., Heckler, 470 U.S. at 833 n.4 (noting that an agency’s decision might be reviewable
“where it could justifiably be found that the agency has ‘consciously and expressly adopted a general
policy’ that is so extreme as to amount to an abdication of its statutory responsibilities” (quoting Adams
v. Richardson, 480 F. 2d 1159, 1162 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (en banc))).
71
See, e.g., Gary Lawson & Christopher D. Moore, The Executive Power of Constitutional
Interpretation, 81 IOWA L. REV. 1267, 1280 (1996) (“One of the President’s most important functions is
to execute the civil and criminal laws of the United States.”).
72
See, e.g., Daniel J. Meltzer, Lecture, Executive Defense of Congressional Acts, 61 DUKE L.J.
1183, 1192‒95 (2012) (discussing conflicting views regarding whether the Take Care Clause implies a
duty to defend); Winkler, supra note 10 (“For decades, presidents, Democrats and Republicans alike,
have taken the position that it’s the executive’s obligation to defend the constitutionality of all federal
laws. The basis for this view is the Constitution’s command that the president ‘shall take Care that the
Laws be faithfully executed.’”).
73
Newdow v. U.S. Congress, 313 F.3d 495, 497‒98 (9th Cir. 2002).
74
The Attorney General’s Duty to Defend and Enforce Constitutionally Objectionable Legislation,
43 Op. Att’y Gen. 275, 275‒76 (1980) (adding that “the Attorney General could lawfully decline to
enforce [a patently unconstitutional law]; and he could lawfully decline to defend it in court”).
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law’ to go forward and defend the constitutionality of the statute.”75 Edward
Corwin has argued that “once a statute has been duly enacted, whether over
[the President’s] protest or with his approval, he must promote its
enforcement by all the powers constitutionally at his disposal unless and
until enforcement is prevented by regular judicial process.”76 Another
commentator has explained that “[s]eparation of powers means, among
other things, that Congress legislates and that the President faithfully
executes the laws. ‘Execution’ means enforcement, but it also implies the
responsibility to defend and to uphold the laws against attacks in court.”77
Finally, others have explained that the need for executive defense of
challenged statutes derives from the fact that “only the Executive Branch
can execute the statutes of the United States.”78
But there is a difference between enforcing a law and defending it.
Enforcing the law requires the Executive Branch to make determinations
about how the law should be implemented and what it should look like in
practice.79 Defending the law, by contrast, does not focus on the operation
75

Kenneth W. Starr, Remarks, Perspectives on the Judiciary, 39 AM. U. L. REV. 475, 480, 485
(1990).
76
EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS 1787‒1957, at 66 (4th rev. ed. 1957);
see also Arthur S. Miller, The President and Faithful Execution of the Laws, 40 VAND. L. REV. 389, 396
(1987) (“Judicially challenging the constitutionality of a statute may not be tantamount to refusing to
obey the statute, but it comes close.”).
77
Note, Executive Discretion and the Congressional Defense of Statutes, 92 YALE L.J. 970, 970
(1983); see also Gussis, supra note 23, at 601 (“The President’s duty to ‘take Care that the Laws be
faithfully executed’ not only requires enforcement, but also implies the President’s responsibility to
defend the laws against attacks in court.” (footnote omitted)). Although a Ninth Circuit panel once
suggested that the Executive Branch’s failure to defend a challenged statute raised constitutional
questions, see Lear Siegler, Inc., Energy Prods. Div. v. Lehman, 842 F.2d 1102, 1123 n.15 (9th Cir.
1988) (“A more established practice of the executive branch is to decline to defend a challenged statute
in court, although this, too, raises a constitutional issue.”), that portion of the opinion was subsequently
withdrawn by the en banc court, see 893 F.2d 205, 206 (9th Cir. 1990) (en banc).
At the state level, too, people have located state executives’ obligations to defend state statutes
against constitutional challenge in parallel constitutional provisions providing that the state executive
should take care that the laws be faithfully executed. Indeed, the proponents of Proposition 8 charged
Governor Schwarzenegger with violating that obligation when he refused to defend Proposition 8 in
court. See Verified Petition for Alternative Writ of Mandamus at 8, Beckley v. Schwarzenegger, No.
3:09-cv-2292 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 26, 2010), available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/36762974/
Beckley-v-Schwarzenegger-Writ-of-Mandamus-Petition (“Governor Schwarzenegger has a duty to see
that the laws are faithfully executed.” (citing CAL. CONST. art. V, § 13)).
78
Attorney General’s Duty to Defend and Enforce, 43 Op. Att’y Gen. at 276 (“[I]f executive
officers were to adopt a policy of ignoring or attacking Acts of Congress whenever they believed them
to be in conflict with the provisions of the Constitution, their conduct in office could jeopardize the
equilibrium established within our constitutional system.”); see also James W. Cobb, Note, By
“Complicated and Indirect” Means: Congressional Defense of Statutes and the Separation of Powers,
73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 205, 208 (2004) (arguing that when Congress defends a statute, it “delegate[s]
the power to execute the law to itself”); id. at 224 (“[T]he [Senate Legal Counsel’s] defense of a statute
‘is the very essence of “execution” of the law.’” (quoting Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 733 (1986))).
79
See, e.g., Mary M. Cheh, When Congress Commands a Thing to Be Done: An Essay on Marbury
v. Madison, Executive Inaction, and the Duty of the Courts to Enforce the Law, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
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of the law and generally will not affect its operation at all. Rather, in
defending a statute, the Executive simply provides the court with its
understanding of what the Constitution requires and its argument for why
the law at issue is consistent with it. To be sure, there may be situations in
which the defense of a law and its enforcement are (at least seemingly)
intertwined, but there remains a meaningful difference between the two
concepts. Indeed, one court of appeals has disaggregated the concepts of
enforcement and defense, describing the President’s authority to refuse to
enforce a statute as “dubious at best,” while describing his authority to
refuse to defend a statute in court as “undisputed.”80 Although the
Executive’s authority to refuse to defend a statute is hardly undisputed,81
what is important is the court’s recognition of the distinction between the
concepts of enforcement and defense.
Moreover, enforcing the law is exclusively reserved to the Executive
Branch. Thus, when the Executive Branch declines to enforce a law, the
President is in fact engaging in a sort of “negative Executive lawmaking,”82
effectively repealing the statute without the participation of the
Legislature.83 To be sure, it is not literally a repeal of the law—the law
remains on the books and could be enforced by a future president—but it
still means that the law is essentially without effect for the duration of the
period of nonenforcement. When the Executive Branch declines to defend a
law, by contrast, the law remains in operation,84 and someone else can
253, 276 (2003) (“[T]he executive branch was responsible for implementing the law, meaning the
executive branch had the duty to enforce the law.”); Lawson & Moore, supra note 71, at 1284‒85
(describing the executive power as the power to put laws into effect); Robert J. Reinstein, The Limits of
Executive Power, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 259, 315 (2009) (“[E]nforcing the laws is not a mechanical task.
Many statutes are ambiguous and have not been definitively interpreted by the courts. Many other
statutes delegate considerable authority to the executive branch to decide how the underlying purposes
of the statutes should be effectuated.”).
80
Ameron, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 787 F.2d 875, 889 (3d Cir. 1986).
81
See, e.g., infra note 162.
82
E.g., Eugene Gressman, Take Care, Mr. President, 64 N.C. L. REV. 381, 382‒83 (1986) (“Such
refusal to execute, even though due to constitutional doubts about the statute, amounts to a partial repeal
of the statute—a repeal that constitutionally can be effected only through the normal legislative
processes.”). To be sure, the law remains on the books and could be enforced by a subsequent President,
but that does not change the fact that the law will go unenforced in the meantime. See id. at 382
(“[W]hen the President tries to do more than he is permitted by statute, he becomes a lawmaker, a status
foreign to the constitutional division of power.”).
83
See id.
84
Of course, there is a rich literature on whether and when the President may decline to enforce a
statute that he believes is unconstitutional. See, e.g., David Barron, Constitutionalism in the Shadow of
Doctrine: The President’s Non-Enforcement Power, 63 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 61 (2000); Dawn E.
Johnsen, Presidential Non-Enforcement of Constitutionally Objectionable Statutes, 63 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 7 (2000). That debate is beyond the scope of my Article, and I do not take a position
on it other than to note that the nondefense of statutes is, in my view, far less troubling than their
nonenforcement. See Gressman, supra note 82, at 384 (“[T]he Executive can refuse to defend the
constitutionality of a statute when judicial review has been properly instituted. But this right is a far cry
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explain to the court why the statute should be upheld.85 It is then left to the
courts to determine whether the law is, in fact, constitutional—just as they
would have done had the Executive Branch continued to defend the statute.
Moreover, in such a situation, these new defenders of the law are in no
sense intruding on the Executive Branch’s authority to enforce the law
because they are not determining how or when the law should be
implemented.86
Thus, enforcement and defense are, in my view, distinct activities, and
only the former is properly viewed as a species of the Executive Branch’s
obligation to take care that the laws are faithfully executed. Under this
view, this first justification for the notion that the Executive Branch has an
absolute duty to defend challenged statutes is unpersuasive.
2. United States v. United States.—Another reason why the
Executive Branch has been viewed as having a duty to defend challenged
statutes (although one more implicit in the commentary) seems to rest upon
the view that it is inappropriate for the United States to speak with more
than one voice in court and that the Executive Branch should be the United
States’ exclusive agent in this context. The Supreme Court, in fact, has
described the proposition that “there is more than one ‘United States’ that
may appear before this Court” as “somewhat startling.”87 It has also noted
that

from saying that the Executive may express his constitutional displeasure with a duly enacted statute by
ignoring or refusing to execute it in the first instance.”).
85
Indeed, the Executive Branch is often not alone in explaining to the Court why statutes should be
upheld even when it chooses to defend them; rather, amici often aid the Executive Branch in its defense
of challenged statutes. To be sure, there is a meaningful difference between party status and amicus
status, and amicus participation is less frequent in the trial court, but the existence of this amicus
participation at any level nonetheless suggests reason to question whether there is anything inherently
problematic with nonexecutive actors defending statutes in court. For discussions of alternatives to
executive defense of statutes and an argument that such alternatives are permissible, see infra Part IV.
86
To be sure, in the course of defending a statute, its proponents may offer their own interpretations
of the statute’s meaning. Such interpretations offered in litigation, however, need not be viewed as
binding on the government and almost certainly should not be viewed as binding if made by an entity
other than the Executive Branch. Cf. Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 U.S. 469, 476 (1992)
(“If the Director asked us to defer to his new statutory interpretation, this case might present a difficult
question regarding whether and under what circumstances deference is due to an interpretation
formulated during litigation.”); Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 212 (1988) (“[W]e
have declined to give deference to an agency counsel’s interpretation of a statute where the agency itself
has articulated no position on the question, on the ground that ‘Congress has delegated to the
administrative official and not to appellate counsel the responsibility for elaborating and enforcing
statutory commands.’” (quoting Inv. Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 628 (1971))).
87
United States v. Providence Journal Co., 485 U.S. 693, 701 (1988); see also United States v. An
Easement & Right of Way, 204 F. Supp. 837, 839 (E.D. Tenn. 1962) (“It appears to the Court that there
could not be any issue between the TVA and the FHA, both being the United States, which this Court
could litigate or adjudicate.”).
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[One reason] for reserving litigation in this Court to the Attorney General and
the Solicitor General, is the concern that the United States usually should
speak with one voice before this Court, and with a voice that reflects not the
parochial interests of a particular agency, but the common interests of the
Government and therefore of all the people.88

Similarly, in denying the Senate standing in a case, the Ninth Circuit noted
that “[a] public law, after enactment, is not the Senate’s any more than it is
the law of any other citizen or group of citizens in the United States. It is a
law of the United States of America,”89 and the court bemoaned the
possibility that “a challenger of a law [might] have to contend with fighting
the United States itself, and separately defending himself against the Senate
and the House of Representatives, each of which would be able to appear as
a separate litigating party in the case.”90
This concern also manifests in court doctrine, perhaps most
significantly in political question doctrine. Under political question
doctrine, courts are supposed to refrain from deciding certain cases that are
more appropriately resolved outside the courts.91 Although there are many
different situations that can trigger the application of political question
doctrine,92 one reason courts refrain from resolving political questions is to
avoid “the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements
by various departments on one question.”93 In other words, there is an
important intuition that governmental division should not be expressed in
the courts.
Yet despite the significance of this discomfort, it remains largely
unexplained. Neither case law nor commentators ever make clear why it is
embarrassing for the government to speak with more than one voice when
that multiplicity of voices simply reflects the complicated reality of a
multidimensional United States and a multiplicity of views regarding the
constitutionality of a statute.94 To be sure, there are contexts in which it is
88

Providence Journal Co., 485 U.S. at 706; accord Days, supra note 27, at 502 (“[B]y making it
unnecessary for Congress to become involved in litigation except in unusual cases, the Solicitor
General’s policy of defending the acts of Congress ensures that the government speaks with one voice in
the Supreme Court while at the same time reinforcing the Executive Branch’s status as the litigating arm
of the government.”).
89
Newdow v. U.S. Congress, 313 F.3d 495, 499 (9th Cir. 2002).
90
Id. at 500.
91
See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, More Supreme Than Court? The Fall of the Political Question
Doctrine and the Rise of Judicial Supremacy, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 237, 240 (2002) (“Underlying the
political question doctrine and this constitutional design is the recognition that the political branches
possess institutional characteristics that make them superior to the judiciary in deciding certain
constitutional questions.”).
92
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) (describing the factors that create a nonjusticiable
political question).
93
Id.
94
See Michael Herz, United States v. United States: When Can the Federal Government Sue Itself?,
32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 893, 907 (1991) (“The Court’s image of a unified federal government . . . is
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important for the United States to speak with one voice or to act in a unified
manner. For example, in explaining why the Framers “commit[ted] sole
power to lay imposts and duties on imports in the Federal Government,” the
Court identified the need for “the Federal Government [to] speak with one
voice when regulating commercial relations with foreign governments.”95
Related, the Court has noted that a “‘concern for uniformity in this
country’s dealings with foreign nations’ . . . animated the Constitution’s
allocation of the foreign relations power to the National Government.”96
But just because speaking with one voice makes sense in some
contexts does not mean that it makes sense in all contexts.97 Where the
United States is not speaking to an external actor, but instead determining
internally the validity of its laws and how those laws should be interpreted,
there does not seem to be the same importance to speaking with one voice.
If the courts are supposed to be the final arbiters of such questions,98 or even
play a meaningful role in answering such questions, it is unclear why we
should have the Executive Branch determine outside of that forum which of
the possible views of the United States will be the one represented. It seems
far preferable to allow a multiplicity of voices into the courts and to let the
courts use that multiplicity of views to reach the best outcome.
Indeed, the notion that the government currently only speaks with one
voice is simply not true. As Neal Devins and Michael Herz have discussed
at length, “[t]o a greater degree than is often realized or acknowledged, . . .
Congress has placed responsibility for government lawyering with attorneys
outside DOJ,”99 and these other attorneys often have views that are distinct

unrealistic.”); id. at 900 (describing the contention that “the United States is ‘one person’” as “uselessly
conclusory”).
95
Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276, 285 (1976); accord Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of
Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 448 (1979) (noting that Supreme Court cases have “stress[ed] the need for
uniformity in treating with other nations”).
96
Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 413 (2003) (quoting Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 427 n.25 (1964)); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 44, at 277 (James Madison)
(Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003) (noting the “advantage of uniformity in all points which relate to foreign
powers”). But see Sarah H. Cleveland, Crosby and the “One-Voice” Myth in U.S. Foreign Relations,
46 VILL. L. REV. 975, 975 (2001) (“The ‘one-voice’ doctrine is a myth. It finds little support in the
constitutional framework, which divides the foreign relations powers among the three federal branches,
and even less in the actual practice of the government.”).
97
Even in those cases where it is important that the “United States” speak with one voice, there is
still value in recognizing that the United States is composed of many competing parts which may have
competing interests. Recognizing that fact will help ensure that meaningful consideration is given to
sorting out those competing interests and determining which voice—and which message—should be the
United States’ singular message.
98
See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
99
Devins & Herz, supra note 29, at 558‒59; cf. Matthew D. McCubbins et al., Structure and
Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies,
75 VA. L. REV. 431, 470‒72 (1989) (discussing a congressional debate over whether the Attorney
General should represent the EPA in court).
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from those of the Solicitor General.100 As Devins has noted, “[T]he volume
of public disputes between the Solicitor General and independent agencies
is far from insignificant. Substantive conflicts arise every year in cases
argued before the Court.”101 Thus, there are often conflicts between different
components of the Executive Branch that raise challenging questions about
the justiciability of such disputes102 and who should control the
government’s litigation.103
These disputes manifest in many different ways. Sometimes they are
subtle, hidden in the background of the case. In United States v. Mitchell,
for example, the Court considered “whether the Indian General Allotment
Act of 1887 authorizes the award of money damages against the United
States for alleged mismanagement of forests located on lands allotted to
[Native Americans] under [the] Act.”104 The Court, in agreement with the
Solicitor General representing the “United States,” concluded that it did
not,105 but as Justice White noted in his dissent, “[T]he Department of the
Interior . . . disagree[d] with the position taken by the Solicitor General in
this litigation and believe[d] that a money damages remedy should be
permitted.”106
At other times, the intrabranch disputes are more evident because the
DOJ “alerts a court to conflicting agency positions, or an agency that is not
a party participates as an amicus, taking a position in conflict with another

100

See, e.g., Neal Devins, Unitariness and Independence: Solicitor General Control over
Independent Agency Litigation, 82 CALIF. L. REV. 255, 262 (1994) (“The government does not always
speak as a single voice before the Supreme Court. Cabinet-level departments and executive agencies
sometimes air their disputes with each other, Congress, and independent agencies before the Supreme
Court.”); Fraley, supra note 19, at 1256 (“Solicitor General control of independent agency litigation
would insure that the government addressed the Court with a single and coherent voice. This, of course,
is not the current arrangement as a number of administrative entities possess varying degrees of
litigating authority.”); see also United States v. Providence Journal Co., 485 U.S. 693, 702 (1988)
(“[D]isagreement [about a case’s worthiness for certiorari] actually arises on a regular basis between the
Solicitor General and attorneys representing various agencies of the United States.”).
101
Devins, supra note 100, at 258‒59 (“It is atypical but not unusual to see a Solicitor General brief
that the affected agency refuses to join or an agency brief at odds with the ‘Brief for the United
States.’”); cf. Days, supra note 27, at 487 (“[The Solicitor General’s] responsibility is ultimately not to
any particular agency or person in the federal government but rather to ‘the interests of the United
States’ which may, on occasion, conflict with the short-term programmatic goals of an affected
governmental entity.”).
102
See, e.g., Herz, supra note 94, at 898 (“This Article attempts to define which intragovernmental
disputes are justiciable.”).
103
See, e.g., Devins & Herz, supra note 29, at 559 (“[W]e cast a fresh eye on the standard
arguments for DOJ control of litigation.”); Devins & Herz, supra note 31, at 205 (“Who should speak
the government’s voice in court?”).
104
445 U.S. 535, 536 (1980).
105
See id. at 546.
106
Id. at 550 (White, J., dissenting).
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agency that is a party.”107 Sometimes, albeit rarely, the Justice Department
has filed multiple briefs taking different views. For example, in the
landmark campaign finance case Buckley v. Valeo,108 the Executive Branch
was divided on the legislation’s constitutionality, so “the Senior Deputy
Solicitor General in the office . . . became the Acting Solicitor General to
defend the constitutionality of the Federal Election Campaign Act,” while
“Attorney General Edward Levi and Solicitor General Robert Bork filed
another brief by the government . . . express[ing] skepticism as to the
constitutionality of the statute.”109 Thus, the Department spoke with more
than one voice, and the world did not end. To the contrary, the world may
have been better off because the Court had more assistance in reaching its
decision on an important constitutional question.
*

*

*

Thus, in the end, neither of the two primary justifications for a duty to
defend—that it is implicit in the Executive Branch’s responsibility for
enforcing the law or that it is improper for the United States to speak with
more than one voice in court—is sufficient to establish the existence of a
duty that exists in all circumstances. This does not mean that the
Department never has a responsibility to defend challenged statutes; it
could have a prudential obligation to defend challenged statutes even in the
absence of a legal duty to do so. But it does mean that there is no absolute
duty that requires the Executive Branch to defend all statutes, even ones
that the President has concluded are unconstitutional. I next consider the
other criticism leveled against the Obama Administration—that the
Executive Branch nonetheless should defend challenged statutes because its
role (at least in this context) is properly that of Congress’s agent.
II. THE PRINCIPAL–AGENT PROBLEM
As I noted at the outset, implicit (and sometimes explicit) in the
criticisms of the Obama Administration’s DOMA decision was a notion
that the Executive Branch should defend the law because it is Congress’s
agent, and defending the law was the only way it could faithfully fill that
107

Herz, supra note 94, at 934‒35 (footnote omitted). District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570
(2008), the case testing the constitutionality of the District of Columbia’s handgun ban, is another case
in which the Executive Branch was arguably on both sides of the issue. There, the Vice President signed
onto a congressional brief that did not take the same position as the brief of the Solicitor General’s
office. Compare Brief for Amici Curiae 55 Members of U.S. Senate et al. Supporting Respondent,
Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (No. 07-290), 2008 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 157 (brief signed by the Vice
President), with Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Heller, 554 U.S. 570
(No. 07-290), 2008 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 45 (Solicitor General’s brief).
108
424 U.S. 1 (1976).
109
Starr, supra note 75, at 485.
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role. This notion that the Executive Branch is a simple agent—or at least
that it can be useful to think of the Executive Branch in that way—is not
unique to the duty-to-defend context. But there are important limitations to
the utility of applying classic principal–agent principles to executive branch
action. In this Part, I begin by briefly discussing classic principal–agent
principles, and I then explore their limitations in the context of executive
branch action. Finally, I consider what those limitations can teach us about
the Executive Branch’s responsibility for defending challenged statutes.
A. The Classic Principal–Agent Problem
At common law, a principal–agent relationship is one “in which one
person, to one degree or another or respect or another, acts as a
representative of or otherwise acts on behalf of another person with power
to affect the legal rights and duties of the other person.”110 Critical to this
relationship is the principal’s “right to control the actions of the agent.”111
The classic principal–agent problem arises because the principal cannot be
sure that the agent will act in its best interests,112 either because the agent
may intentionally try to subvert the principal’s best interests or because it
simply lacks the incentives to vigorously fulfill the principal’s wishes.113
There are various tools that a principal can use to try to address this
problem, both ex ante and ex post. For example, the principal can provide
the agent with very specific directions, or it can try “to create a structure
that induces the agent to perform in the principal’s interest without
extensive monitoring.”114 The principal can also set up penalties that will be
imposed if the agent fails to fulfill its obligations.
Some accounts of the Executive Branch as agent view Congress as the
principal115 and draw upon classic principal–agent principles when
110

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 cmt. c (2006).
Id. (“A principal’s right to control the agent is a constant across relationships of agency, but the
content or specific meaning of the right varies. . . . A principal’s failure to exercise the right of control
does not eliminate it, nor is it eliminated by physical distance between the agent and principal.”).
112
See, e.g., Stewart J. Schwab, Union Raids, Union Democracy, and the Market for Union
Control, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 367, 376‒77 (“The principal-agent problem arises because the principal
has difficulty evaluating the agent’s effort or the conditions under which the agent operates. Thus, the
principal cannot easily determine whether the agent has done well for the principal or for the agent.”).
113
See, e.g., Jerry Brito & Drew Perraut, Transparency and Performance in Government, 11 N.C.
J.L. & TECH. 161, 162 (2010).
114
Schwab, supra note 112, at 377; see also Thomas A. Simpson, Commentary, A Comment on an
Inherently Flawed Concept: Why the Restatement (Third) of Agency Should Not Include the Doctrine of
Inherent Agency Power, 57 ALA. L. REV. 1163, 1166 (2006) (identifying different ways in which the
principal can “structure the relationship to minimize the agent’s incentives to deviate”).
115
See, e.g., Joel R. Paul, The Geopolitical Constitution: Executive Expediency and Executive
Agreements, 86 CALIF. L. REV. 671, 690 (1998) (“[Chief Justice] Marshall characterized the executive
as the agent or ‘organ’ of Congress.”); Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Interring the Nondelegation
Doctrine, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1721, 1742 (2002) (“Distrust of executive agents frequently causes
Congress to attempt to control the smallest details of executive action . . . .”); Sidney A. Shapiro & Rena
111
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discussing congressional efforts to ensure that the Executive Branch is
acting in a manner faithful to Congress’s commands.116 Jacob Gersen, for
example, has noted that the academic literature “is replete with suggestions
about how and to what extent Congress can effectively control the
bureaucracy, including the use of ex ante procedures, ex post monitoring,
temporal limitations, budgetary appropriations, and other forms of political
influence.”117 Congressional investigations into agency action are one ex
post mechanism that is often the subject of considerable controversy.118
Other scholars have discussed the extent to which Congress tries to delegate
to agents that will be faithful to its wishes. As Daryl Levinson and Richard
Pildes have explained, “[W]hen government is divided, congressional
delegations move away from the Executive Office of the President and
executive agencies and toward independent agencies and commissions,”

I. Steinzor, The People’s Agent: Executive Branch Secrecy and Accountability in an Age of Terrorism,
69 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 99, 104 (2006) (“[A]lthough, through statutes, Congress directs the
executive branch, the executive branch is still the agent of the people.”); cf. Peter H. Aranson et al., A
Theory of Legislative Delegation, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 6 (1982) (“This model postulates that an
increase in delegated legislative authority will increase ‘agency costs,’ (costs engendered by a
divergence of the agent’s goals and those of the principal) but will also diminish the principals’
(legislators’) decisionmaking costs . . . .”); William E. Kovacic, Procurement Reform and the Choice of
Forum in Bid Protest Disputes, 9 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 461, 494 (1995) (“One reason for Congress to
establish multiple, competing ‘agents’ is to ensure that its policy wishes are executed faithfully.”);
Rodriguez, supra note 19, at 1198 (discussing one view of the President’s role under which, “consistent
with his constitutional responsibility to see that the laws are ‘faithfully executed,’ [he] is to manage the
regulatory system in order to ensure that it is an optimal engine for the proper implementation of
congressional policies” (footnote omitted)).
116
See, e.g., Posner & Vermeule, supra note 115, at 1742.
117
Jacob E. Gersen, Overlapping and Underlapping Jurisdiction in Administrative Law, 2006 SUP.
CT. REV. 201, 211‒12 (footnotes omitted); see id. at 212 (“This literature focuses on the use of ex ante
and ex post mechanisms for generating or calibrating the incentives of agents to encourage them to act
consistently with the interests of principals.”). Matthew McCubbins, Roger Noll, and Barry Weingast
have also discussed how an agency’s structure and processes can be used to ensure it is faithful to its
principal, but they acknowledge that the principal is not just Congress but also the “legislative coalition
(including the President) that succeeded in passing the agency’s enabling legislation.” McCubbins et al.,
supra note 99, at 432.
118
See generally William P. Marshall, The Limits on Congress’s Authority to Investigate the
President, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 781 (examining Congress’s power to investigate the President and
arguing for process reforms). For discussion of a recent controversy over the use of the congressional
subpoena authority to investigate an independent agency, see Dave Jamieson, House Dems Accuse Issa
of Shilling for ‘Corporate Interests’ with NLRB Subpoena, HUFFINGTON POST (last updated Oct. 12,
2011, 6:12 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/08/12/issa-nlrb-boeing-subpoena-housedems_n_925561.html. Of course, as some commentators have noted, “[C]onflicts-of-interest among the
members of [the enacting] coalition may prevent them from effectively employing standard ex post
corrective devices . . . .” Murray J. Horn & Kenneth A. Shepsle, Commentary on “Administrative
Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies”: Administrative Process and Organizational Form
as Legislative Responses to Agency Costs, 75 VA. L. REV. 499, 502 (1989).
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that is, “the executive branch actors most insulated from presidential
control, and perhaps also most susceptible to congressional control.”119
Although such models of executive branch action are useful, there are,
of course, important limitations to their utility, particularly when thinking
normatively about the relationship between the branches and the
appropriate parameters of executive branch action. In the context of
executive branch action, after all, there will generally be multiple
principals, and the principals that enacted a law will generally be without
power to direct its execution in the future.120 Moreover, although it is not
uncommon for an agent to have interests that diverge from those of the
principal, the Executive Branch is in some sense unique because it is
supposed to have interests distinct from those of the principal.121
These limitations have important implications for how we think about
executive branch action in many different contexts, as I discuss briefly at
the conclusion of the Article. In the meantime, however, I focus on what
these limitations are and what they can teach us about the Executive
Branch’s role in defending challenged statutes.
B. Executive Branch Action and the Principal–Agent Problem
Simple assumptions often belie more complicated realities. The
assumption that the Executive Branch can act as simple agent for the whole
ignores a much more complicated reality. When the Executive Branch acts
as agent for the whole, the principal is both multiple and changing,
complicating efforts to direct the Executive Branch’s actions. And the
Executive Branch is itself both agent and principal, complicating any
assumption that it can (or should) always act faithfully for the whole.122

119

Levinson & Pildes, supra note 16, at 2358 (“[W]hen Congress does choose to delegate, it will
choose the agent most likely to share its policy preferences.”).
120
Cf. John O. McGinnis & Ilya Somin, Federalism vs. States’ Rights: A Defense of Judicial
Review in a Federal System, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 89, 94 (2004) (“Principal-agent problems are
particularly likely in situations where there are multiple principals . . . .”).
121
See, e.g., Levinson & Pildes, supra note 16, at 2360 (“Congress can attempt to use the usual
tools of oversight and influence to bring the relevant agency back into line, but at least when it comes to
executive branch agencies, there is good reason to expect that the President’s policy preferences will
more often prevail.”); infra notes 137‒43 and accompanying text. As noted earlier, these are problems
that often manifest in the context of corporate organizations. See, e.g., Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A.
Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 259 (1999) (“A related point
is that the principal-agent model assumes that it is clear who the principal is, and who the agent is in the
particular relationship or transaction under study. Yet many of the most important relationships inside
corporations may be more ambiguous, in the sense that both parties may be contributing productive
inputs and neither may have authority over the other.”).
122
See Peter Lindseth, Agents Without Principals?: Delegation in an Age of Diffuse and
Fragmented Governance 2-3 (Univ. Conn. Sch. Law Articles & Working Papers, Paper No. 18, 2004),
available at http://lsr.nellco.org/uconn_wps/18/ (discussing the “autonomy” enjoyed by the agent when
a “legislative ‘principal’” delegates power “to a subordinate ‘agent’”).
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1. Who Is the Principal?.—As noted above, in the paradigmatic
principal–agent relationship, complications can arise because the agent is
not faithful to the principal’s wishes. But there is, at least, a clear principal.
It is the principal’s right and responsibility to determine the appropriate
course of action, and the agent (in theory) will follow the principal’s
direction.
In the context of executive branch action, by contrast, the principal’s
identity is (arguably) unclear, and its ability to control the agent’s action is
(at best) incomplete. Under one view, as I noted above, Congress is the
principal and sets out directions in its legislative commands, which the
Executive Branch, as agent, is supposed to put into action.123 Under another
view, the American people are the principal, and Congress and the
President alike are their agents.124
In some sense, of course, the American people do provide broad policy
directions through the people they elect to higher office.125 But it is the
people they elect who actually establish—through legislation, treaties, and
the like—our nation’s substantive laws and policies. In that sense, it is our
elected officials who are the principals. And the relevant elected officials
are not just members of Congress. After all, Congress rarely acts alone in
establishing the United States’ substantive laws and policies. For example,
when there is a legislative command, that command most often reflects the
will of both the President and Congress. Pursuant to the presentment
process, the President signs almost all legislation.126 Indeed, many laws
originate as components of the President’s legislative agenda, and the White
House may have played a significant role in their drafting and subsequent
passage.127
Moreover, the principal is not necessarily the President and Congress
in office when the particular law or policy at issue is being executed.
Rather, the principal is the enacting legislative coalition, which will very
often not be the legislative coalition in existence at the time of execution.
123

But see Shapiro & Steinzor, supra note 115, at 104 (suggesting that the American people are the
principals because “when legislation is enacted, it can be regarded as an expression of the people
regarding the nature and scope of the collective action they seek”).
124
See, e.g., Carlos E. González, Reinterpreting Statutory Interpretation, 74 N.C. L. REV. 585, 639
(1996) (“[T]he federal Constitution as a unified whole embodies the ultimate exercise of popular
sovereignty—the creation of an agent/government by a principal/people.”); Robert Post & Reva Siegel,
Popular Constitutionalism, Departmentalism, and Judicial Supremacy, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 1027, 1032
(2004) (“Because both the President and the Congress are agents of the people’s will, popular control of
constitutional meaning demands that Congress and the President must be free to make and act on their
own interpretations of the Constitution.”).
125
See, e.g., Horn & Shepsle, supra note 118, at 499.
126
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7 (describing the presentment process).
127
See generally James P. Pfiffner, The President’s Legislative Agenda, 499 ANNALS AM. ACAD.
POL. & SOC. SCI. 22, 23 (1988) (noting that “it is a commonplace in the last decades of the twentieth
century that the president is our chief legislator” and discussing the history of presidential involvement
in the legislative process).
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As Daniel Rodriguez has explained, “[A]dministrators are responsible for
obeying the mandates of the program as constructed by the enacting
legislature,” but “[a]gencies carry out their functions in the shadow of the
current legislature, an institution made up of members with individual goals
and agendas.”128 Thus, as Horn and Shepsle note, “[T]he enacting
coalition . . . must worry not only about the potential for bureaucratic
drift . . . , but also about the influence of subsequent political coalitions on
the development and administration of the law.”129
This intertemporal complication will often be salient in assessing
whether the principal can effectively control the actions of the agent. After
all, when the President signs a bill into law, that law generally remains on
the books until and unless it is subsequently repealed,130 remaining valid
even after the President and Congress that enacted it have left office.131
Often, the current President and Congress will not support a law that their
predecessors did,132 which means that even if Congress were institutionally
capable of exercising control over the Executive Branch’s actions,133 the
128

Rodriguez, supra note 19, at 1192; id. at 1187‒88 (noting that “regulatory policy . . . is made in
the shadow of two legislatures,” the legislature that “enacted the statute” and “the one that exists
contemporaneously with the program under evaluation,” and “there may be substantial differences in the
extent of the legislature’s current commitment to the program as constituted and as functioning,” even if
the legislature is “made up of many of the same members of the original coalition that created the
program”); see also Jack M. Beermann, Congressional Administration, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 61, 71
(2006) (“[O]nce post-hoc supervision comes into play, the difficulties may be magnified, with a new
coalition or group within Congress acting in accordance with aims that may be different from those of
the coalition that originally enacted the law being administered.”).
129
Horn & Shepsle, supra note 118, at 499.
130
The only exceptions are laws that contain sunset provisions that include the date of their own
expiration. See generally Jacob E. Gersen, Temporary Legislation, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 247 (2007).
131
Cf. William W. Buzbee, The One-Congress Fiction in Statutory Interpretation, 149 U. PA. L.
REV. 171, 173 (2000) (“[T]he concept of a single Congress producing legislation is undoubtedly a
fiction. As reflected in the numbering of a new Congress every two years, different members, coalitions,
parties, moods, and leadership change the nature of each Congress.”). Notwithstanding the regular
change in the composition of Congress, it is well-established that the preferences of the legislative
coalition that enacted the law are supposed to govern its execution, even after that coalition has left
office. See, e.g., Rodriguez, supra note 19, at 1188 (“[A]gencies’ and courts’ struggles to discern what
the enacting legislature intended, by resort to the text and legislative history of the statute, give a special
pride of place to the preferences of the legislative coalition that enacted the statute.”).
132
Variously referred to as “retentionist bias” and “legislative inertia,” existing law can become
entrenched for reasons that have nothing to do with the merits of the law or the levels of support it
currently enjoys. See, e.g., Donald R. Livingston & Samuel A. Marcosson, The Court at the Crossroads:
Runyon, Section 1981 and the Meaning of Precedent, 37 EMORY L.J. 949, 971 n.87 (1988) (“[A]
number of systemic factors (the congressional committee system, the executive veto, the influence of
special interest groups) . . . give the advantage to those who resist change.”); Rodriguez, supra note 19,
at 1188 (“Legislation that has lost current legislative support may still persist where legislative
institutions, such as ‘gatekeeper’ committees, restrictive amendment rules, and the presidential veto,
stand in the way of change.”). See generally GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF
STATUTES 102, 123‒24 (1982).
133
This is a dubious proposition at best. Congress is itself composed of 535 different individuals
with different interests and views and has only unwieldy tools for exercising control over any executive
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Congress that is in office at the time the Executive Branch is acting—and
therefore the Congress that must try to check any abuse of the Executive
Branch’s delegated authority as it occurs—may not have the incentive to do
so. Conversely, the actual principal—the enacting coalition—will have no
power to control the Executive Branch’s actions. Thus, in the context of
executive branch action, there will rarely be a principal capable of
exercising sustained control over the agent’s actions in the same way as
exists in the paradigmatic principal–agent context.
2. Executive Branch as Principal and Agent.—As noted above, in the
paradigmatic principal–agent context, agents agree to act to fulfill their
principal’s wishes. These agents may sometimes have to make discretionary
decisions about how to fulfill the principal’s wishes,134 but the goal remains
the same.135 It is unsurprising then that “[p]roblems may arise . . . if the
agent and principal have diverging interests.”136 Yet such problems are
virtually inevitable when the Executive Branch is the putative agent because
it will often have interests that diverge from those of the principal. The
Executive Branch, after all, has never agreed to act only to fulfill the wishes
of Congress (or even the people). To the contrary, it is supposed to have its
own views on questions of both law and policy, and (at least sometimes) it
is supposed to act on them.137 In other words, the Executive Branch is, in
some sense, both agent and principal.
As noted above, the Executive Branch’s role in setting the nation’s
substantive law and policy generally begins during the legislative process

branch agent. Cf. Rodriguez, supra note 19, at 1184 (“[Congress] is an unruly and far-flung lawmaking
institution that has limited capacity to pursue systematic, focused regulatory change.”); Mark
Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic State, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1511, 1551
(1992) (describing the “factors [that] contribute to an institutional inertia that undercuts the effectiveness
of direct legislative reaction as a regular means of checking agency policymaking”). This particular
problem is, of course, not unique to the context of executive branch action. See, e.g., Blair & Stout,
supra note 121, at 249 (“Because corporations are fictional entities that can only act through human
agents, problems of agent fealty are frequently encountered by those who study and practice corporate
law.”).
134
See, e.g., Blair & Stout, supra note 121, at 259 (noting that typical principal–agent analysis does
not “address situations in which part of the agent’s job is to figure out what needs to be done (a situation
we suspect is the norm rather than the exception in most public corporations)”); Simpson, supra note
114, at 1165 (“Typically, the principal delegates some decisionmaking authority to the agent.”).
135
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.02 reporter’s note f (2006) (“The Comment
explores common reasons for slippage between a principal’s intention in stating instructions to an agent
and the agent’s subsequent conduct. The Comment does not presuppose that the agent’s act stems from
the agent’s own interests or other improper purposes.”).
136
Simpson, supra note 114, at 1166 (“[T]he agent may choose to gratify his own interests at the
principal’s expense.”).
137
This relationship between the Executive Branch and the Legislature is, of course, rooted in our
adoption of a “presidential system, with its sharp divorce of executive from legislative.” Esmond
Wright, The Revolution and the Constitution: Models of What and for Whom?, 428 ANNALS AM. ACAD.
POL. & SOC. SCI. 1, 6 (1976).
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(through presentment and the President’s role in setting the legislative
agenda), and it continues through the law’s execution. In part, such active
involvement in the lawmaking process is inevitable: enforcement inherently
necessitates some measure of discretion, requiring decisions to be made
about how and when laws should be enforced. As the nation’s law
enforcer,138 the Executive Branch is responsible for making those decisions,
both domestically (for example, setting the nation’s enforcement policies in
areas ranging from immigration to drugs) and internationally (for example,
deciding when to bring trade disputes alleging that a trade agreement has
been violated). In part, this responsibility also results from the broad
delegations of power often given to the Executive Branch through
legislation.139 In any event, whatever the cause, there can be no question that
the Executive Branch—just like the Legislative Branch—is supposed to
engage in substantive policymaking.140
Indeed, if the Executive Branch were intended simply to follow
specific legislative commands with no exercise of discretion involved, there
would be little reason for political appointees to head executive branch
agencies. But the Executive Branch is, of course, full of such appointees
intended to ensure that the Executive Branch’s policymaking is reflective of
the political and philosophical views of the President who heads it.141 As has
138

See, e.g., Cheh, supra note 79, at 276 (“[T]he executive branch was responsible for
implementing the law, meaning the executive branch had the duty to enforce the law.”). In fact, courts
have held that Congress does not have “a direct ‘stake’ in the enforcement of [the law]. Once a law is
passed and upheld as constitutional, Congress’s interest in its enforcement is no more than that of the
average citizen.” Ameron, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 787 F.2d 875, 888 (3d Cir. 1986); accord
Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Emps. v. Pierce, 697 F.2d 303, 305 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (noting that a Senator had
standing where “[h]e claimed an interest which he, as a senator, had in the legislative process, different
from any interest that he, like any other citizen, may have had in the execution of the bill once enacted”).
139
See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984) (noting that Congress may
have legislated in general terms to give the executive branch agency the opportunity to balance
“conflicting policies” because “those with great expertise and charged with responsibility for
administering the provision would be in a better position to do so”); David Epstein & Sharyn
O’Halloran, The Nondelegation Doctrine and the Separation of Powers: A Political Science Approach,
20 CARDOZO L. REV. 947, 948 (1999) (noting “the numerous cases in which the President and executive
agencies are given real policymaking discretion in their own right, with either no statutory guidance or
guidance that is so broad that it imposes almost no constraints on executive actions”).
140
See, e.g., McCubbins et al., supra note 99, at 470 (“The Justice Department is itself a
policymaking agency, and historically it has been especially closely tied to the President.”); cf. Epstein
& O’Halloran, supra note 139, at 950 (“Congress is . . . wary . . . of ceding too much authority to
executive branch actors who may pursue their own policy goals rather than those of the enacting
legislative coalition.”).
141
There is a rich literature, both descriptive and normative, that addresses the extent of presidential
control over the administrative state. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments for the
Unitary Executive, 48 ARK. L. REV. 23 (1995); Abner S. Greene, Checks and Balances in an Era of
Presidential Lawmaking, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 123 (1994); Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The
President and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1994); cf. Michael Herz, Imposing Unified
Executive Branch Statutory Interpretation, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 219, 219 (1993) (noting “the
increasingly systematic efforts of every President since Richard Nixon to gain control of the federal
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been much discussed in the literature, there is often a resulting struggle
between the Executive Branch and the Legislature for control over the
administrative state.142 As one commentator has noted, “The key decision
makers at agencies are typically political appointees, in many cases serving
solely at the pleasure of the President. Agency officials are thus much more
likely to be faithful agents of the executive than of Congress.”143
The fact that the Executive Branch may have its own interests and
views that do not fully represent or capture the interests of all of the parts
that comprise the United States has often manifested in interbranch disputes
in the courts.144 Indeed, the Solicitor General is often viewed as representing
“the executive branch of the United States government,” rather than the
United States as a whole,145 a fact which inevitably leads to conflicts of
interest. As one commentator has noted, “[A]llowing the executive branch
to represent its coequal partner [Congress] is like inviting the fox to guard
the henhouse.”146
bureaucracy”). Whatever one thinks about the question as a normative matter, there can be little debate
that presidential control over the administrative state is significant, if not complete. See, e.g., Elena
Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2248 (2001).
142
See, e.g., LOUIS FISHER, THE POLITICS OF SHARED POWER: CONGRESS AND THE EXECUTIVE 106
(4th ed. 1998) (discussing “control of the bureaucracy” as a “deep-rooted” “source of executivelegislative friction”); cf. Aranson et al., supra note 115, at 6 (“[T]he removal of politics from
administrative processes really occurs only in civics books.”); McCubbins et al., supra note 99, at 435
(“[T]he President’s role in appointing the top administrators of agencies offers him an advantage in
influencing policy, especially for agencies in the executive branch where the top administrators serve at
the pleasure of the President.”).
143
William P. Ferranti, Interest Group Theory and Untrustworthy Outcomes: A Case Study of the
Bonneville Power Administration, 35 MCGEORGE L. REV. 637, 646 (2004).
144
See infra notes 147‒58 and accompanying text; see also Herz, supra note 94, at 910 (“Courts
regularly permit interbranch litigation.”). The idea that the Executive and the Congress are sometimes at
odds is hardly a novel one in American law and is, in some sense, inherent in our nonparliamentary
system of government. Cf. Charles H. Koch, Jr., The Devolution of Implementing Policymaking in
Network Governments, 57 EMORY L.J. 167, 197 (2007) (“The separation of the executive and the
legislative in a presidential system empowers the judiciary to act as arbiters between the two.”).
145
Rex E. Lee Conference on the Office of the Solicitor General of the United States: Pre-Reagan
Panel, 2003 BYU L. REV. 40 (statement of Judge Frank Easterbrook); see id. at 40–41 (“[The Solicitor
General] is litigating on behalf of the executive branch. . . . [Where] [t]he executive branch of the United
States government, acting through the people appointed for that purpose, had settled on a particular
antitrust policy and civil rights policy, . . . his job was to defend it.” (statement of Judge Frank
Easterbrook)); see also Rebecca Mae Salokar, Representing Congress: Protecting Institutional and
Individual Members’ Rights in Court, in CONGRESS AND THE POLITICS OF EMERGING RIGHTS 105, 107
(Colton C. Campbell & John F. Stack, Jr. eds., 2002) (quoting a 1926 brief in which the petitioner noted
that the Government was “question[ing] the constitutionality of its own act,” “the Solicitor General
[was] appearing as a representative of the Executive Department of the Government,” and a Senator was
“represent[ing] another branch”).
146
Salokar, supra note 145, at 106; accord United States v. Providence Journal Co., 485 U.S. 693,
714 (1988) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“When faced with a difference of view between the Executive
Branch and a coordinate branch of government, . . . the Solicitor General faces a conflict of interest that
undeniably would be intolerable if encountered in the private sector.”); Miller & Bowman, supra note
62, at 67‒68 (“[I]n interbranch litigation there is no such thing as ‘the United States.’ There is the
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Consequently, Congress has frequently intervened in litigation to
challenge the view that the Executive Branch was faithfully acting for the
United States as a whole.147 In such cases, it is often “the United States
Senate or the Leadership of the United States House of Representatives”
purporting to “defend[] the interests of Congress as an institution,”148 “either
because the Executive Branch was seen to be misinterpreting Congressional
intent or otherwise not adequately enforcing the law”149 or because the
“Solicitor General, while representing the United States before the Supreme
Court, [was viewed as] fail[ing] to properly defend a federal statute.”150
This desire to protect Congress’s own institutional interests was
evident in Morrison v. Olson,151 a case addressing the constitutionality of
the independent counsel provision of the Ethics in Government Act.152 The
Act “allow[ed] for the appointment of an ‘independent counsel’ to
investigate and, if appropriate, prosecute certain high-ranking Government
officials for violations of federal criminal laws,”153 and it granted the
counsel “full power and independent authority to exercise all investigative
and prosecutorial functions and powers of the Department of Justice” “with
interest of the President, as in executive privilege, and the interest of the Congress in the enforcement of
its laws.”).
147
See JUDITHANNE SCOURFIELD MCLAUCHLAN, CONGRESSIONAL PARTICIPATION AS AMICUS
CURIAE BEFORE THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 1 (2005) (“Members of Congress have come to play an
increasingly significant role as lobbyists before the U.S. Supreme Court.”); see also R. Lawrence
Dessem, Congressional Standing to Sue: Whose Vote Is This, Anyway?, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 1
(1986) (“In recent years Members of the United States Congress have brought suit against the executive
branch of the federal government with growing frequency.”). According to McLauchlan, this is “[t]he
most frequent type of case in which Members of Congress file amicus briefs.” MCLAUCHLAN, supra, at
81.
148
MCLAUCHLAN, supra note 147, at 51; see also id. at 54 n.170 (“In 10% of the cases in which
Members of Congress participate as amici, they do so under the auspices of the House or Senate Legal
Counsel’s Offices, acting in the interests of the U.S. Senate or the U.S. House [of] Representatives.”).
When the Senate or House files an institutional brief, that does not mean that every member of the body
agrees. See, e.g., INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 929 n.4 (1983).
149
MCLAUCHLAN, supra note 147, at 51.
150
Id. at 52; accord Salokar, supra note 145, at 116 (noting that Congress is most likely to be
defending the constitutionality of a statute “where Congress must fill the shoes of the ‘United States’
because the Department of Justice has chosen not to, or where Congress suspects that the executive
branch will not provide a hearty defense of the law”); see also Brief of the Speaker and Bipartisan
Leadership Grp. of the House of Representatives as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, Japan
Whaling Ass’n v. Am. Cetacean Soc’y, 478 U.S. 221 (1986) (Nos. 85-954, 85-955), 1986 U.S. S. Ct.
Briefs LEXIS 347, at *3 (The House filing an amicus brief to resist “novel theories of separation of
powers . . . presented to [the] Court indirectly by the Executive and more openly by the Japanese
petitioners”); Brief of the Speaker & Bipartisan Leadership Grp., Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714
(1986) (Nos. 85-1377, 85-1378, 85-1379), 1986 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 160, at *21 (“The Senate and
House parties intervened [in the district court] to defend the Act against the Executive’s
challenge . . . .”).
151
487 U.S. 654 (1988).
152
28 U.S.C. §§ 49, 591‒598 (1982).
153
Morrison, 487 U.S. at 660.
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respect to all matters in such independent counsel’s prosecutorial
jurisdiction.”154 The Executive Branch viewed this as an inappropriate grant
of executive power and decided that the interests of the “United States” lay
not in defending the statute, but in arguing that it was unconstitutional.155
The Congress unsurprisingly disagreed, and both houses filed amicus briefs
defending the legislation’s constitutionality.156 In invoking the Supreme
Court rule that allows the United States to file amicus briefs without the
consent of the parties,157 the House clearly sought to suggest that it (and not
the Executive) was now acting for the United States.158 Whichever branch
could more rightly claim that it was acting on behalf of the whole, one thing
is clear: simple assumptions of faithful agency on the part of the Executive
Branch proved problematic.
C. The Duty to Defend and the Principal–Agent Problem
As I noted at the outset, executive branch representatives act for the
United States every day in many different contexts around the world.
Recognizing the complications inherent in thinking of the Executive Branch
as a simple agent may have important (and varying) implications across
those different contexts—both in terms of determining the proper roles for
the Executive Branch and the Legislature in effectuating our nation’s
substantive law and policy and in determining whether (and what) controls
may sometimes be necessary to ensure that the Executive Branch’s actions
are consistent with the authority it has been delegated. But whatever lessons
these complications may have to teach in other contexts, there are two clear
lessons in the context of the Executive Branch’s role in defending
challenged statutes.

154

§ 594(a).
See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellees, Morrison, 487 U.S. 654
(No. 87-1279), 1988 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 980, at *9 (“The interest of the United States in this case
is in preserving an important part of the power and duty of the President to ‘take Care that the Laws be
faithfully executed.’”). The Executive Branch took this position in both the lower courts and in the
Supreme Court.
156
See Brief for the United States Senate as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellant, Morrison, 487
U.S. 654 (No. 87-1279), 1988 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 992; Brief of the Speaker & Leadership Grp. of
the House of Representatives as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellant, Morrison, 487 U.S. 654 (No. 871279), 1988 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 995, at *8 n.2. (“Participation by the Speaker and Leadership
Group is the standard mechanism by which the House of Representatives pursues its institutional
interests in litigation.”). The House and Senate both filed amicus briefs defending the constitutionality of
the legislation in the lower court as well. See In re Sealed Case, 838 F.2d 476, 477 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
157
See SUP. CT. R. 37(4).
158
See Brief of the Speaker and Leadership Group, supra note 156, at *8 n.2 (“In light of the
institutional nature of this participation and the status of the House of Representatives in the government
of the United States, it would appear appropriate for the Speaker and elected leadership of the House of
Representatives to avail themselves of the right to submit a brief as amici curiae without the consent of
the parties, in accordance with the provisions of Sup. Ct. R. 36.4.”).
155
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First, the existence of intertemporal complications means that the
principal that enacted a law at t1 will often have no authority to control the
agent’s actions in defending the law at t2. In the case of DOMA, this
disconnect is obvious. DOMA was passed in 1996 by the 104th Congress
and signed into law by President Clinton.159 Fifteen years later, there was a
new Congress and a new President. It is utterly unsurprising that this new
Congress and this new President have different views about DOMA and its
constitutionality than did their predecessors.160
But the fact that a current President and Congress may not support a
law is irrelevant to the question of whether it should be defended (at least so
long as the current President and Congress are unwilling to repeal the law
through legislative action). In our constitutional system, the President and
Congress cannot undo the work of their predecessors through implicit
action, and the courts—not the political branches—are the final arbiters of
constitutional questions. Recognizing that the principal that enacted the law
has no power to ensure that it is defended means that outside actors may
sometimes need to take up the defense of challenged statutes in cases where
neither the current President nor the current Congress is willing to do so.161
Second, the fact that the Executive Branch is at once both principal and
agent makes it utterly unsurprising that the Executive Branch (specifically,
the President and his political appointees at the DOJ) might have its own
views about legal questions, including ones that do not directly implicate
core areas of executive power. After all, regardless of whether one believes
it is appropriate for the Executive Branch to act upon its own independent
views of legal questions,162 it is not surprising that it should have such
159

Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996).
To be sure, some members of Congress who supported DOMA in 1996 might no longer support
it in 2011. But whether that is the case or not, it is utterly unsurprising that the 112th Congress and
President Obama may not want to defend this law.
161
See infra notes 217‒28 and accompanying text.
162
There is a substantial debate in the literature on that question. See, e.g., Carpenter, supra note 15,
at 406‒07 (“Now a growing number of respected constitutional theorists, coming from a broad range of
political and jurisprudential perspectives, have begun to question the legitimacy of judicial supremacy in
constitutional interpretation.”); Robert A. Schapiro, Judicial Deference and Interpretive Coordinacy in
State and Federal Constitutional Law, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 656, 658 (2000) (“Even as judicial
supremacy gains ascendancy in the courts, its star is on the decline in the legal academy.”); Frederick
Schauer, Judicial Supremacy and the Modest Constitution, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 1045, 1045 (2004)
(“Judicial supremacy is under attack. From various points on the political spectrum, political actors as
well as academics have challenged the idea that the courts in general, and the Supreme Court in
particular, have a special and preeminent responsibility in interpreting and enforcing the Constitution.”).
Compare, e.g., Lawson & Moore, supra note 71, at 1268 (“It is emphatically the province and duty of
the President to say what the law is . . . .”), and Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch:
Executive Power to Say What the Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217, 222 (1994) (arguing that the President has
the power “to interpret the law, including the Constitution, independently of the other branches’
interpretations”), with, e.g., Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional
Interpretation, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1359, 1362 (1997) (“[W]e defend . . . [the] assertion of judicial
primacy without qualification . . . .”), Burt Neuborne, The Binding Quality of Supreme Court Precedent,
160
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views.163 And if it can (and should) have such views, it makes little sense to
say that it cannot present those views to the courts.
After all, even if one is not prepared to accept the idea that the
Supreme Court’s claims of interpretive supremacy are merely “selfinterested assertion[s]” inconsistent with “constitutional first principles,”164
and thinks instead that the Executive Branch is obliged “to comply with the
law as judicially declared,”165 that does not mean the Executive Branch
should suppress its views when the Court is deciding what the law is.166
Indeed, it may actually facilitate judicial resolution of the issues for the
Executive Branch to present the courts with its own best views of the legal
question at issue.
*

*

*

Thus, in the end, I do not think it is correct to cast the Executive
Branch as Congress’s agent in this context and to argue that it must always
defend challenged statutes for that reason. But, again, the fact that the
Executive Branch need not defend challenged statutes does not mean that it
should not. After all, even in the absence of a legal obligation, it may make
sense for the Executive Branch to generally assume responsibility for
defending challenged statutes. But it does mean that there may be
circumstances in which it does not make sense for the Executive Branch to
do so. In the next Part, I consider the context in which the Obama
Administration declined to defend DOMA, and I argue that the Executive
Branch should not defend challenged statutes where it believes the statute is
unconstitutional or even has questions about its constitutionality.

61 TUL. L. REV. 991, 993 (1987) (“[S]o long as the judicial precedent remains viable, the executive’s
duty is to conform its conduct to the Supreme Court’s precedent, not merely as a matter of respect,
prudence, expedience, or realpolitik, but as a matter of formal legal obligation.”), and Schauer, supra, at
1046 (“I seek to . . . show that the judicial role labeled ‘judicial supremacy’ is the natural partner of
constitutionalism itself.”).
163
See, e.g., Owen Fiss, Between Supremacy and Exclusivity, 57 SYRACUSE L. REV. 187, 187
(2007) (“Throughout history, the Supreme Court has been depicted as the final arbiter of the meaning of
the Constitution. Such a view does not deny the role that the other branches of government or, for that
matter, the general citizenry have in interpreting the Constitution. It only posits a priority for the
interpretations of the judicial branch. The governing assumption is that where there are conflicting
interpretations, the Court’s should prevail.”).
164
Paulsen, supra note 162, at 225.
165
Neuborne, supra note 162, at 993.
166
See id. at 1002 (arguing that even though the Attorney General “is bound by law to conform to
established Supreme Court precedent,” he is “free to seek to persuade the Supreme Court to change its
mind by seeking reargument and presenting new cases for decision”).
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III. DEFENDING EXECUTIVE NONDEFENSE
In his statement announcing that the DOJ would no longer defend
DOMA, the Attorney General explained that “[t]he President has . . .
concluded that Section 3 of DOMA, as applied to legally married same-sex
couples, . . . is . . . unconstitutional,” and that “[g]iven that conclusion, the
President has instructed the Department not to defend the statute in [such
cases].”167 The Attorney General also stated that he “concur[red] in [the
President’s] determination.”168 In this Part, I assume that the President or his
political appointees in the DOJ have determined that the law at issue is
unconstitutional or, at minimum, have genuine questions about its
constitutionality. I do not consider the internal process by which the
President or the Department have arrived at that conclusion or whether this
is a determination in which the President should always be involved.
Instead, I simply focus on the reasons why the Department should not act
for the United States in such a context.
A. The Adversary System
A defining and distinctive feature of the American legal system is its
commitment to an adversarial system of justice.169 Although this
commitment may be imperfectly realized, it manifests in numerous
practices and procedures that define the American justice system. Standing
doctrine, for example, is routinely justified as a means of “ensur[ing] the
proper adversarial presentation” of issues, a presentation that will facilitate
the courts’ ability to adjudicate cases and will improve the quality of the
courts’ decisions in the end.170
Brian Goldman has explained that the adversarial system of justice
serves four distinct functions: “accuracy, acceptability, neutrality, and the
resolution of actual disputes.”171 It furthers accuracy by ensuring that the
court has before it all of the relevant facts and legal precedents, and it
167

Letter from Eric H. Holder, Jr., Attorney Gen., to John A. Boehner, Speaker, U.S. House of
Representatives, supra note 8, at 5.
168
Id.
169
See, e.g., Frost, supra note 22, at 495 (“[T]he adversarial system itself is widely acknowledged
to be a fundamental feature of the American adjudicatory process.”); William B. Rubenstein, A
Transactional Model of Adjudication, 89 GEO. L.J. 371, 371 (2001) (“The traditional premise of
American civil adjudication is that ours is an adversary system: Litigation is a process by which an
impartial arbiter resolves a dispute between private parties following an adversarial demonstration of
privately developed facts and zealously presented legal arguments.”); see also Heather Elliott, The
Functions of Standing, 61 STAN. L. REV. 459, 470 (2008) (noting that standing doctrine is rooted in the
notion that the parties’ adverseness “promote[s] better litigation”).
170
Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 517 (2007); see also Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl.
Study Grp., Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 80 (1978) (invoking the courts’ interest in “assur[ing] that the most
effective advocate of the rights at issue is present to champion them” in the context of prudential
limitations on standing).
171
Goldman, supra note 22, at 940.
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promotes acceptability by “providing parties with procedural justice:
control over their own cases and a fair opportunity to be heard.”172
Neutrality follows from the fact that the parties maintain control over their
own cases; because the parties are providing the court with the information
it needs, the court does not become “too active a participant in the
proceedings.”173 Finally, by confining themselves to the resolution of actual
disputes, the courts ensure that they do not transgress established limits on
the judicial role.174
As a general matter, the Executive Branch’s participation in a case
promotes the adversarial system of justice and the underlying goals the
system is supposed to promote. After all, where the Executive Branch
believes that the challenged law is constitutional, there will generally be no
one better positioned to defend it. The Executive Branch’s lawyers have the
skills and resources to zealously advocate in defense of the United States
and its laws. They can provide the court with all of the information and law
it will need to resolve the case, and they will often be particularly well
positioned both to advise the court as to how the law works in practice and
to determine which arguments will serve the nation’s short- and long-term
interests.
But for the reasons discussed above, there will be cases in which the
Executive Branch does not actually believe the law is constitutional (or at
least has questions about its constitutionality) and cases in which the
Executive Branch’s ability to zealously defend the statute may be
compromised.175 For example, where the Executive Branch believes a law is
172

Id. at 943.
Id. at 947 (quoting Stephan Landsman, The Decline of the Adversary System: How the Rhetoric
of Swift and Certain Justice Has Affected Adjudication in American Courts, 29 BUFF. L. REV. 487, 491
(1980)).
174
See, e.g., Duke Power Co., 438 U.S. at 103 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) (“We are
not statesmen; we are judges.”); Liverpool, N.Y. & Phila. Steamship Co. v. Comm’rs of Emigration, 113
U.S. 33, 39 (1885) (“[The Court] has no jurisdiction to pronounce any statute, either of a State or of the
United States, void, because irreconcilable with the Constitution, except as it is called upon to adjudge
the legal rights of litigants in actual controversies. In the exercise of that jurisdiction, it is bound by two
rules, [one of which is] . . . never to formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the
precise facts to which it is to be applied.”); Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Injury and the Disintegration of Article
III, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 1915, 1920 (1986) (“It is a judge’s obligation to decide private disputes. If, as part
of that process, interpretation of the constitutionality of statutes is required, so be it. The trigger of
judicial power, however, is the protection of private rights.”).
175
See Devins & Prakash, supra note 20, at 572 (“[A] law’s proponents are more likely to
vigorously defend the statute than is the Solicitor General, who, in the course of a tepid defense of a law,
might admit its constitutional infirmities.”). One commentator has argued that “[t]he Constitution itself
provides sufficient means for Congress to encourage the executive to defend vigorously all federal
statutes: the appropriations power, the impeachment power, the investigatory and oversight power, and
the legislative power.” Cobb, supra note 78, at 233 (footnotes omitted). In theory, perhaps this is right;
but in practice, it seems unlikely that Congress can effectively monitor the Executive Branch’s litigation.
Moreover, this view seems to ignore the complications presented by modern political realities. See
generally Levinson & Pildes, supra note 16, at 2315 (“The practical distinction between party-divided
173
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unconstitutional, it may be unwilling to make the strongest arguments that
can be made in its defense. After all, the Executive can—and often does—
have its own independent views of the Constitution,176 and those
independent views may affect what arguments it is willing to make in its
briefs.177 Indeed, the Executive Branch has long maintained that it will make
only “reasonable” arguments in defense of a statute, and that not every
“plausible” or “professionally responsible argument[]” is a “‘reasonable’
one.”178 As one long-time Senate staffer noted, this was a recurrent problem
that contributed to the need for the Senate Legal Counsel: the DOJ “might
not like the statute, and it might not defend it quite as vigorously as we
would like, or it might use arguments that are not the same arguments we’d
make.”179 And regardless of whether this was a frequent problem in the past,
the modern prospect of the circulation of briefs on the Internet may make it
more likely that the executive branch will be reticent to publicly take legal
positions with which it disagrees.180
In such cases, the Executive’s “defense” of a statute may actually
undermine the interests of an adversarial system of justice more than it

and party-unified government rivals in significance, and often dominates, the constitutional distinction
between the branches in predicting and explaining interbranch political dynamics.”).
176
See, e.g., Paulsen, supra note 162, at 221 (“[T]he executive’s power to interpret the law may,
and should, be exercised independently of the interpretations of other branches, including those of the
federal courts.”). Paulsen and others have gone even farther to argue that the Executive’s determinations
regarding which laws are unconstitutional should guide its enforcement decisions. See, e.g., id. at
221‒22 (“[The President] may decline to execute acts of Congress on constitutional grounds, even if it is
those grounds have been rejected by the courts. In executing a statute he determines is constitutionally
valid, he may use his own interpretation of the statute, even if it is contrary to the interpretation placed
on it by the courts.”); see also William Baude, Signing Unconstitutional Laws, 86 IND. L.J. 303, 307
(2011) (“I share the increasingly conventional wisdom that the President must interpret the Constitution
for himself, and must not enforce laws he believes violate it.”); Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, The
Executive’s Duty to Disregard Unconstitutional Laws, 96 GEO. L.J. 1613, 1616‒17 (2008) (“[The
President] violates his constitutional oath when he enforces a law he regards as unconstitutional.”).
177
There are other institutional actors that may also have interests independent of their client. The
ACLU and the Washington Legal Foundation, for example, are ideological actors, and they presumably
will hesitate before making arguments that win the battle but lose the war. Thus, their views and
interests are going to influence the nature of the arguments that they make in court, which can raise
interesting ethical questions.
178
Letter from Eric H. Holder, Jr., Attorney Gen., to John A. Boehner, Speaker, U.S. House of
Representatives, supra note 8, at 5.
179
Interview with Charles Ludlam, Senate Historical Office Oral History Project, The Senate Legal
Counsel: Interview #1, at 22 (Dec. 2, 2003) [hereinafter Ludlam Interview], available at http://
www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/resources/pdf/Ludlam_Interview1.pdf.
180
For example, when the Obama Administration’s early briefs in the DOMA litigation contained
arguments that were reasonably understood to be anti-gay, a firestorm of controversy erupted. Cf.
Richard Brust, Dead Precedents: The Justices Overrule, but They Often Do So Stealthily, A.B.A. J.,
May 2011, at 22, 23 (quoting Professor Paul Horwitz as saying, “In a media-heavy age, the court is so
aware of being watched that it’s especially loath to act with what might be seen as a heavy hand.”).
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promotes them.181 Where the Executive is unwilling to make all of the
arguments that could be made in defense of a statute, the court will not
receive a full presentation of the relevant issues and arguments, thus at least
potentially undermining the accuracy of the system. And the court may
have to engage in more independent research then it would otherwise find
necessary, thereby undermining the system’s interest in preserving a neutral
decision maker.
The DOMA litigation provides an apt example of how the Executive
Branch’s views regarding the constitutionality of a statute can influence its
ability to defend it. After all, the Obama Administration abandoned
arguments in defense of DOMA that had been made by the Bush
Administration. The Bush Administration, for example, had argued that
“section 3 of DOMA [is] rationally related to the legitimate government
interest in encouraging the development of relationships that are optimal for
procreation”182 and that “Congress may permissibly decide to encourage the
creation of stable relationships that facilitate the rearing of children by both
of their biological parents.”183
One can strongly disagree with those arguments yet still recognize that
they might be persuasive to certain judges.184 Once the Obama
Administration abandoned those arguments, it was forced to make
arguments that were at best weak and at worst incoherent: for example, that
the legitimate governmental interest underlying DOMA was its interest in
maintaining the status quo, a curious argument, given that the status quo
prior to the enactment of DOMA simply recognized as valid any marriage
conducted in a state that recognized it as valid. Moreover, while one might
think that arguments about procreation would do little to promote the
accuracy of the courts’ decisions regarding DOMA, one can easily imagine
situations in which the Government’s failure to present the court with all of
the relevant facts and law could undermine the accuracy of the court’s
conclusion.185

181

See Peter L. Strauss, The President and Choices Not to Enforce, 63 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
107, 120 (2000) (“The integrity of the judicial process may be undercut when parties put forward for
duty’s sake a position to which, in fact, they do not subscribe.”).
182
Memorandum in Support of Fed. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 15, Wilson v. Ake, 354 F.
Supp. 2d 1298 (M.D. Fla. 2005) (No. 8:04-cv-1680-T-30TBM), 2004 U.S. Dist. Ct. Motions LEXIS
31640, at *27–28 (“Congress could seek to encourage the creation of stable relationships in which
people can securely procreate.”).
183
Id. at 16.
184
See, e.g., Standhardt v. Superior Court, 77 P.3d 451, 463 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003).
185
One could imagine, for example, a Republican administration agreeing to defend the health care
legislation, but only on the basis of the taxing and spending power, thus leaving out of the statute’s
defense critical empirical information that would buttress the statute’s validity under the Commerce
Clause. Whether the court in such cases should appoint additional counsel to present or develop a
particular argument is a difficult question.
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To be sure, amici may step in and make some of the arguments that the
Executive Branch declines to make. But amici will generally be unable to
develop the factual record before the trial court, which means that the court
will either decide the case based on an incomplete factual record or based
on facts that have not been subjected to the rigors of adversarial testing.
Moreover, amici will generally receive less attention than the parties,
especially when the party is the United States as represented by executive
branch lawyers. Finally, amici will have fewer pages of briefing and
generally no opportunity to present their views to the court through oral
argument. Thus, where the Executive Branch fails to zealously defend a
statute, the zealousness of amici will generally be insufficient to address the
problem.
The Executive Branch’s failure to zealously defend a statute can also
undermine the general public’s willingness to accept the court’s decision.
When Goldman wrote that the adversarial system improves the
acceptability of decisions, he focused primarily on the parties’ acceptance
of a court’s decision,186 but the public’s acceptance is also important,
especially where the significance of the case will extend far beyond the
immediate parties. If the public perceives that the Executive Branch did not
mount a full defense of the statute, it may undermine the public’s
confidence in a decision striking it down. It is not difficult to imagine that
this would have happened if the Obama Administration had continued its
defense of DOMA, as commentators were already criticizing the
Administration for mounting a “deliberately weak legal defense” of the
statute.187 Here, too, the advent of the Internet and the wider distribution of
government briefs may contribute to a decline in the acceptance of court
decisions where it is perceived that the government failed to mount a full
defense of the statute.
There is thus reason to think that the Executive Branch’s defense of a
statute may undermine adversarialism more than it promotes it in cases
where the Executive Branch has questions about the law’s constitutionality.
To be sure, private attorneys often take positions with which they disagree
and argue for laws which they may think are unconstitutional. And there is
no doubt that executive branch lawyers could do the same. But, as I argue
in the remainder of this Part, the Executive Branch is different than private
counsel. Although private counsel’s primary interest is in victory for their
clients,188 the Executive Branch has its own institutional interests, and it
186

See Goldman, supra note 22, at 943‒47.
“Deliberately Weak Legal Defense,” CAL. CATHOLIC DAILY (July 12, 2010), http://calcatholic.
web141.discountasp.net/news/newsArticle.aspx?id=14f12763-f31f-43be-89ea-9ea2de53948a.
188
All lawyers, of course, have some duty to the court, but their primary duty is to zealously
advocate on behalf of their client. Cf. James A. Cohen, Lawyer Role, Agency Law, and the
Characterization “Officer of the Court,” 48 BUFF. L. REV. 349, 350 (2000) (“[I]n our adversary system
the lawyer’s duty to the court is almost entirely harmonious with the lawyer’s duty as agent for her
client.”).
187
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should not be forced to take legal positions contrary to those interests.
Doing so may undermine both the Executive Branch’s own interests and its
relationship with the courts.
B. The Executive’s Independent Interests
As discussed above, the Executive Branch has—and should have—its
own legal views, and those views will sometimes be distinct from those
views that should be advanced to zealously defend a challenged statute.189 In
some cases, the Executive Branch’s interests are institutional; indeed, it is
in the context of such cases that the Executive, recognizing its own conflict
of interest, has historically been particularly likely to decline to exercise its
duty to defend. In many other cases, the Executive’s interest is not
institutional; the Executive Branch simply has a view on a legal question
which is contrary to the defense of the statute. Whether institutional or not,
the Executive Branch should be able to articulate its own best view of the
law not only to influence the courts, but also to make its view of the law
clear to the general public.
After all, the role of government lawyers may be to influence judges,
not the general public,190 but the general public nevertheless pays attention
when the Executive Branch speaks—probably more so now than ever
before. And when the Executive Branch speaks in court, it may be
technically representing the United States, but realistically (and reasonably),
the public is often going to assume that the views the Executive Branch is
expressing are its own.191 This means not only that the Executive Branch
189

See, e.g., Devins & Prakash, supra note 20, at 526‒32 (discussing the President’s “interpretive
independence” in the context of analyzing the duty to defend); Miller & Bowman, supra note 62, at 65
(“Although the President undoubtedly represents the United States in certain constitutionally delineated
areas, this does not establish that the interests of the two entities are interchangeable.”). From this
premise, Miller and Bowman reach an arguably surprising conclusion. In their view, “‘the United States’
is a single entity with multiple heads,” and “perceiving ‘the United States’ as a single entity makes the
propriety of the Justice Department judicially challenging an act of Congress dubious at best.” Id. at 70,
72. I take the opposite view: because the “United States” is composed of many competing parts, it will
not always make sense for only one part to act on behalf of the whole.
190
See Lee, supra note 59, at 600 (“The audience for [the Solicitor General’s] briefs and arguments
consists of nine people and nine people only. To the extent that his efforts to persuade those nine people
also yield some other benefits, that is fine, but that is not his job. Public relations and mass
communications are not what he was trained for and not what he does well.”).
191
This explains, for example, why the Obama Administration was criticized so vehemently for
arguments in an early DOMA filing that were viewed as anti-gay. See, e.g., John Aravosis, Obama
Defends DOMA in Federal Court. Says Banning Gay Marriage Is Good for the Federal Budget. Invokes
Incest and Marrying Children, AMERICABLOG (June 12, 2009, 9:44 AM), http://
www.americablog.com/2009/06/obama-justice-department-defends-doma.html (describing the brief as
“despicable, and gratuitously homophobic”); Kerry Eleveld, Obama and DOMA: The Unspoken Truth
and How We Got Here, EQUALITY MATTERS (Feb. 24, 2011, 2:59 PM), http://equalitymatters.org/blog/
201102240011 (“[N]early every major LGBT organization eventually denounced the brief . . . .”); Deb
Price, Gays Feel Short-Changed by Obama, CREATORS.COM, http://www.creators.com/liberal/deb-price/
gays-feel-short-changed-by-obama.html (last visited Aug. 13, 2012) (describing “Gay Americans” as
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may be held accountable for views it does not hold but also that those views
may in fact be granted greater legitimacy because they are associated with
the President. In other words, forcing the Executive Branch to make
arguments in which it does not believe—or prohibiting it from making
affirmative arguments in which it does—hurts the President’s ability to
effectively use his office as a bully pulpit.
It is again worth noting that I do not take the position that the
Executive Branch should (or necessarily even can) decline to defend
statutes solely because it disagrees with them as a matter of policy. But the
President is just as entitled to share his views on questions of law as he is
on questions of policy.192 And on significant legal questions—such as the
constitutionality of laws that discriminate on the basis of sexual
orientation—the President may well want to share his views with the
general public, in part because of the possibility that the general public’s
views might in turn be shaped by the President’s.
Indeed, in cases where the Executive Branch believes that a law is
unconstitutional, nondefense provides a means of expressing such
opposition that is arguably less problematic than nonenforcement. As I
noted above, there are arguments that the Executive can—and even
should—decline to enforce laws that it deems unconstitutional.193 While the
arguments about nonenforcement are beyond the scope of this Article, it
does seem that there is (at minimum) something more troubling about
nonenforcement than nondefense. Because the Executive Branch’s authority
to enforce statutes is, in many respects, exclusive, the Executive Branch’s
decision not to enforce a statute effectively invalidates the law (at least
during the period of nonenforcement), in contravention of the Executive’s
proper role in our constitutional system.194 Equally troubling, it can often
(although not always) undermine the possibility of judicial review.195

“infuriated and dismayed by a pair of shockingly anti-gay legal briefs filed by President Barack
Obama’s Justice Department”).
192
See Walter Dellinger, The DOMA Decision, NEW REPUBLIC (Mar. 1, 2011, 12:00 AM), http://
www.tnr.com/article/politics/84353/gay-marriage-obama-gingrich-doma?page=0,1 (“I don’t believe that
any administration is obliged to urge a court to accept propositions that the president believes are
fundamentally wrong . . . .”).
193
See supra Parts II, III.
194
See, e.g., Lear Siegler, Inc., Energy Prods. Div. v. Lehman, 842 F.2d 1102, 1124 (9th Cir. 1988)
(“To construe this duty to faithfully execute the laws as implying the power to forbid their execution
perverts the clear language of the ‘take care’ clause: ‘To “execute” a statute . . . emphatically does not
mean to kill it.’” (quoting Miller, supra note 76, at 398)).
195
See id. at 1125 (“We also note that in declaring the CICA stay provisions unconstitutional and
suspending their operation, the executive branch has assumed a role reserved for the judicial branch. It
hardly need be repeated that ‘it is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say
what the law is.’ . . . The executive branch’s attempt to arrogate to itself the power of judicial review is a
paradigmatic violation of our system of separation of powers and checks and balances.” (quoting
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803))).
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C. The Executive and the Courts
The Executive Branch’s ability to provide the courts with its own best
view of the law, irrespective of the effect such a view will have in a
particular case, also contributes (in part) to the Executive Branch’s special
relationship with the courts.196 Whatever obligations government lawyers
may have to their client, the United States, they also “have an obligation to
see to it that justice is done.”197 This special obligation carries with it both
responsibilities and rewards: the responsibility to temper zealous advocacy
with a commitment to the right outcome and the concomitant reward of
special respect from the courts. The special relationship between
government lawyers and the courts in which they appear is perhaps most
evident in the relationship between the Solicitor General and the Supreme
Court. Often heralded as the “tenth justice,” the Solicitor General enjoys a
special relationship with the Court and has a “special duty” toward it.198 One
former Solicitor General has explained that this special duty results in
“advocacy which is more objective, more dispassionate, more competent,
and more respectful of the Court as an institution than it gets from any other
lawyer,”199 even if that approach sometimes undermines the defense of
federal statutes.200
As former Solicitor General Robert Bork explained in a letter
defending the Solicitor General’s decision in Buckley to file two briefs
taking different positions, “The standing of the Department and the
Solicitor General before the Supreme Court . . . rests . . . upon a sense of
obligation to the Court and to the constitutional system so that we often
196

There is no single explanation for the special esteem in which government lawyers are generally
held by the courts, and the quality of their work is surely an important factor in the way they are viewed.
See, e.g., Fraley, supra note 19, at 1267 (“[I]t is recognized that the work product of the Solicitor
General’s office is unparalleled.”).
197
W. Bradley Wendel, Government Lawyers, Democracy, and the Rule of Law, 77 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1333, 1349 (2009) (“Courts similarly state that government lawyers have an obligation to see to it
that justice is done, not simply to maximize the likelihood that the client’s interests will be achieved.”);
see also Lee, supra note 59, at 595‒96 (“[There are] three distinct ways in which the government lawyer
as a litigator has an enhanced responsibility as an officer of the court . . . .”).
198
Cordray & Cordray, supra note 42, at 1361. To be sure, there are competing conceptions of the
role of the Solicitor General, but fundamental to any view of the Solicitor General is his special
relationship with the Court. See, e.g., id. (“(1) the Solicitor General as ‘tenth justice’; (2) the Solicitor
General as advocate for the federal government as an institution; and (3) the Solicitor General as
advocate of the President’s administration.”); William K. Kelley, Avoiding Constitutional Questions as
a Three-Branch Problem, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 831, 878 (2001) (“A large body of literature analyzes the
proper role of the Solicitor General in developing the legal positions of the executive branch . . . . Some
have claimed that the Solicitor General’s role is to serve the interests of the Court, as a sort of superadvisor on the correct answer to legal questions; others stress that the Solicitor General’s job is to
advocate (within reasonable limits) the legal positions of the executive branch in the Supreme Court.”
(footnote omitted)).
199
Lee, supra note 59, at 597.
200
See Days, supra note 27, at 488.
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behave less like pure advocates than do lawyers for private interests.”201
Allowing Executive Branch lawyers “to present the issues in the round,”202
that is, to attempt to present both sides of an argument, facilitates the
Executive Branch’s ability to help the courts reach the proper outcome.203
If government lawyers forsake this obligation and fail to present the
courts with their best view of the law, those actions can undercut the special
esteem in which they are generally held. This in turn damages not only the
Executive Branch, but also the United States because that special respect,
borne out of both the special integrity of government lawyers and the
quality of their advocacy, surely contributes to the success that the
government generally enjoys in litigation.204
To be sure, if the Executive Branch were to begin abandoning the
defense of statutes simply because it disagreed with them as a matter of
policy—and not because it had legitimate questions about their legality—
that could also damage the reputation of government lawyers, who are
supposed to be influenced by the law, not by politics.205 But where the
Executive Branch has real questions about the legality of a statute—
separate and apart from its views regarding the politics and policy of the
underlying statute—the Executive Branch is not playing politics when it
articulates those views to the courts. It is simply presenting the courts with
its best understanding of the law. And the courts can then trust that the
Executive is committed to presenting its best view of the law—both in
cases where it agrees with the statute as a matter of policy and in cases
where it does not.

201

Buckley Hearings, supra note 60, at 500.
Id. at 501.
203
See id. (“[I]n a matter of this significance, a case of perhaps the greatest constitutional
significance of this century, it seems to me entirely appropriate that the Court have before it whatever
we can add.”).
204
See Lee, supra note 59, at 597 (noting that the Solicitor General must use her power carefully,
“lest the reservoir of credibility which is the source of this special advantage be diminished, with
adverse consequences not only to the government’s ability to win cases, but also to an important
institution of government itself”).
205
See, e.g., Paul D. Clement, The Intra-Executive Separation of Powers, 59 EMORY L.J. 311, 317
(2009) (noting the “temptation” in the Solicitor General’s office to change positions following an
election, but arguing that some changes can “come[] at a great cost to the credibility of the Solicitor
General and the Office of the Solicitor General before the Court”); Meltzer, supra note 72, at 1214
(expressing the concern that an administration’s decision to “reverse course [in defending a statute] will
inevitably lead to a charge that the incumbent administration is picking and choosing whether to defend
statutes based on its policy preferences”). Of course, the two are not wholly unrelated. Whether one
thinks that the health care reform law is unconstitutional may turn in part on one’s understandings about
the effect of the uninsured on the rest of the health care market, and whether one thinks DOMA is
constitutional may turn on one’s views about the validity of the potential government interests
underlying the statute.
202
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IV. AN ALTERNATIVE DEFENSE
If the Executive Branch should not defend a challenged statute where it
has questions about its constitutionality, the critical question remains of
what should happen. The Executive Branch could, of course, do what it did
in Buckley, presenting the court with its own best view of the law as well as
what it believes to be the strongest arguments in support of the statute.
Although I think that approach has much to commend it, it has been only
rarely adopted by the Executive Branch, and so I focus on those situations
in which the Executive Branch declines to participate at all. In such a case,
the absence of executive defense should not mean no defense because the
statute’s constitutionality should ultimately be determined by the courts and
with the assistance of zealous advocates on both sides. I consider first two
alternatives to executive defense and then some objections to these
proposed alternatives.
A. Congress
The first and most obvious alternative to executive defense is the one
that has historically been most common and that was adopted in the case of
DOMA: congressional defense. By statute, the Attorney General is required
to “submit to the Congress a report of any instance in which the Attorney
General or any officer of the Department of Justice . . . determines . . . to
refrain (on the grounds that the provision is unconstitutional) from
defending . . . the constitutionality of any provision of any Federal [law].”206
That notification provides Congress with the opportunity to participate in
litigation in defense of challenged statutes when the Executive declines to
do so. Indeed, the Senate Legal Counsel was created, at least in part, in
response to concerns that the Executive Branch was “failing to defend the
constitutionality of some statute[s].”207
206

28 U.S.C. § 530D(a)(1) (2006).
See Ludlam Interview, supra note 179, at 21‒22 (noting that the Senate Legal Counsel was
established, in part, because of one of its progenitor’s amazement at the fact that “the executive branch,
which was supposedly responsible for taking care that the laws be faithfully executed, was failing to
defend the constitutionality of some statute[s]”). More generally, the Senate Legal Counsel was a
response to Watergate and the perceived need for some institution to represent Congress’s interests in
court. See id. at 15. As a staffer principally responsible for the establishment of the Senate Legal
Counsel has explained, prior to its establishment, “there was no office in the Congress that was handling
this critical litigation function in defense of the separation of powers and checks and balances. . . . We
had a badly flawed, ad hoc system, a patchwork system that left us mostly defenseless against attacks on
our constitutional status.” Id.; see also Removing Politics from the Administration of Justice: Hearing on
S. 2803 and S. 2978 Before the Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
93d Cong. 29 (1974) (statement of Sen. Vance Hartke) (“A counsel for the Congress would not be in the
business of enforcing the law, but rather he would provide an authoritative interpretation of the laws on
behalf of the institution of Congress rather than for the courts to rely solely upon the Justice Department
or another party to the case.”). There is no joint counsel because at the time the Senate Legal Counsel
was created, the House had an established system for dealing with litigation through its Clerk’s Office
and thus had no interest in a joint counsel. See Ludlam Interview, supra note 179, at 24.
207
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There are two principal legal objections to Congress’s participation in
this way. First, one might object that it violates separation of powers
principles because it permits Congress to participate in the execution of the
laws.208 But for the reasons discussed above,209 I do not think that defending
a law in court is the same as executing the law, and thus I do not think
Congress’s involvement raises separation of powers concerns. Second, one
might object that congressional participation in the defense of statutes raises
the thorny problem of legislator standing.210 I do not think this is a real
obstacle to congressional participation either.
As an initial matter, when Congress defends a statute in the
Executive’s stead, it is not acting for itself but instead for the United States.
To put it somewhat differently, Congress is merely acting as the United
States’ agent in the defense of the validly enacted law that is being
challenged in court. Recognizing that there can be complications inherent in
the Executive Branch acting as agent for the whole—and that sometimes it
is not well-positioned to fulfill that role—simply means that sometimes it
will be necessary to find another agent. Congress is a natural choice to fill
that role. This is thus quite different than the typical context in which
congressional standing is raised, that is, where individual members of
Congress are challenging a law.
In any event, even if congressional standing were the appropriate frame
for thinking about congressional intervention in this context, such
intervention is still meaningfully different than the paradigmatic situation in
which individual legislators are challenging a law. In Raines v. Byrd, for
example, the Supreme Court rejected the standing of six individual
members of Congress who sued to challenge the constitutionality of the
Line Item Veto Act, concluding that they have “alleged no injury to
themselves as individuals.”211 “[T]he institutional injury they allege,” the
Court concluded, “is wholly abstract and widely dispersed . . . , and their
attempt to litigate this dispute at this time and in this form is contrary to
historical experience.”212 But in rejecting standing in that case, the Court
“attach[ed] some importance to the fact that appellees have not been
authorized to represent their respective Houses of Congress in this action,
and indeed both Houses actively oppose their suit.”213
208

See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 726‒27 (1986) (“To permit an officer controlled by
Congress to execute the laws would be, in essence, to permit a congressional veto. Congress could
simply remove, or threaten to remove, an officer for executing the laws in any fashion found to be
unsatisfactory to Congress. This kind of congressional control over the execution of the laws, Chadha
makes clear, is constitutionally impermissible.”).
209
See supra notes 79‒86 and accompanying text.
210
See Dessem, supra note 147, at 13 (“[T]he doctrine[] of congressional standing . . . remain[s], at
best, in a state of confusion and uncertainty within the District of Columbia Circuit.”).
211
521 U.S. 811, 829 (1997).
212
Id.
213
Id.
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After all, whatever one thinks about whether individual legislators
should have standing, the practice of the Legislature (or a branch of the
Legislature) appearing in court to represent its own institutional interests
seems far less troubling.214 In fact, the ability of Congress as an institution
to participate in litigation has repeatedly been recognized, especially in
cases where the Executive Branch has failed to defend the statute at issue.
In INS v. Chadha, for example, the Court accepted with no hesitation the
propriety of Congress’s participation, noting that “from the time of
Congress’ formal intervention . . . concrete adverseness [was] beyond
doubt.”215 To be sure, it may be necessary for Congress (acting as agent for
the whole) to play a different and more active role in the litigation than it
has traditionally played in litigation in the past. Traditionally, Congress’s
intervention (whether as a party or an amici) has been limited to the courts
of appeals or the Supreme Court; if Congress is to act for the United States
in the defense of challenged statutes, it may sometimes (as in the case of the
DOMA litigation) have to participate in the trial court and assist in the
development of the factual record. But there is no reason why Congress’s
lawyers should not be able to participate in that process.
The most significant problem seems to me to be not a legal one but a
practical one. The Senate Legal Counsel and the House General Counsel’s
Office do not have the focused mission of the DOJ’s litigating components

214

See, e.g., Karcher v. May, 484 U.S. 72, 84‒85 (1987) (White, J., concurring in the judgment)
(“[W]e have now acknowledged that the New Jersey Legislature and its authorized representative have
the authority to defend the constitutionality of a statute attacked in federal court. . . . It is also clear that
because [the legislators] did not seek to intervene as individual legislators in a nonrepresentative
capacity, we again leave for another day the issue whether individual legislators have standing to
intervene and defend legislation for which they voted.”); Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Brennan, 571 F.
Supp. 2d 1105, 1126 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (rejecting legislator standing, but noting that “[n]either the Senate
nor the House of Representatives as a whole is seeking to compel the submission of the Research Plan or
the Scientific Assessment. Nor are the intervenor-applicants alleging they have been authorized to
represent their respective Houses of Congress in this action”); Dessem, supra note 147, at 26 (“In
situations where Congress suffers an institutional injury . . . a suit brought by Congress would not pose
the same practical problems as do actions by individual Members of Congress.”). But see Barnes v.
Kline, 759 F.2d 21, 44 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Bork, J., dissenting) (arguing that congressional standing
represents a “constitutional upheaval”); see also Newdow v. U.S. Congress, 313 F.3d 495, 497 (9th Cir.
2002) (“Let it first be said that the issue is not whether the United States has standing to appear in
support of the constitutionality of the statute in question. Nobody doubts that it does. . . . The question is
whether the Senate, as a separate part of the government, has standing to intervene to support statutes on
its own behalf, and not really as a representative of the United States itself.”). The Ninth Circuit did not
explain why the Senate was allowed to appear in a series of cases that “directly (particularly) implicated
the authority of Congress within our scheme of government” if it could not appear to represent its
institutional interests. Id. at 498. In any event, it is unclear that even the Ninth Circuit under Newdow
would object to the Senate representing the United States’ interests in the defense of a challenged
statute.
215
462 U.S. 919, 939 (1983). Admittedly, the Court made that point in its discussion of whether
there was a “case or controversy,” but that Congress’s intervention occasioned no commentary suggests
that the Court viewed it as unexceptional.
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and thus may need additional resources to help them fulfill this role.216
Indeed, if the DOJ started to more regularly refuse to defend federal
statutes, it might be that Congress’s legal offices should receive additional
funding and staffing so that they can hire lawyers who will be able to focus
exclusively on this responsibility. After all, if the courts are going to rely on
the adversarial system to help them determine the constitutionality of
federal statutes, we want the adversary defending the statute to be able to
provide the strongest defense possible.
B. Appointed Counsel
The existing scholarship on the executive duty to defend seems to
assume that in the absence of executive defense, congressional defense is
the only alternative. This assumption presumably rests on the premise that
if the United States (as embodied in the Congress and the Executive) no
longer wants to defend the statute, then there is no live controversy. But
recognizing the possibility for temporal tensions between the United States’
component parts highlights the fallacy of this approach; by the time a
particular statute is challenged, the Congress that enacted it may be gone,
and the current Congress may or may not be any better positioned than the
Executive to zealously defend it.217 In other words, recognizing that the
current Congress and Executive are, in some cases, not themselves
principals, but instead agents for the Congress and Executive that enacted a
law in the past, helps explain why there must be alternatives to both
executive and congressional defense. A United States law remains good law
unless and until it is repealed, and thus it should be defended in court.
After all, if the Congress and the Executive could choose not to defend
a law and no one else could replace them, they would be able to do
indirectly what they do not have the political will to do directly—that is,
repeal the law. Allowing such an implicit repeal would undermine
democratic accountability, especially given that congressional nondefense

216

See Cobb, supra note 78, at 210 (“In addition to the authority to defend a federal statute, the
SLC exercises other litigation-related responsibilities . . . includ[ing] bringing a civil action to enforce a
subpoena issued by the Senate or one of its subparts, defending against a subpoena . . . , presenting
amicus curiae arguments, representing the Senate or one of its committees in immunity proceedings,
defending the Senate or one [o]f its subparts in a civil action . . . , and performing various advisory
duties.” (footnotes omitted)). These offices are relatively recent innovations, responses to the need for
offices capable of protecting congressional interests when the Executive Branch did not. See Days,
supra note 27, at 501 (noting that historically, when “the Executive and Legislative Branches were
irretrievably at loggerheads, Congress was forced to hire private counsel or even send one of its own
members into court”).
217
See Days, supra note 27, at 503 (identifying one instance in which Congress elected not to
defend a statute after the DOJ notified Congress that it would not defend the statute); see also Meltzer,
supra note 72, at 1211‒13 (noting that “congressional pinch-hitting will often not be a full substitute for
defense by the executive” because whether Congress will defend a challenged statute “depend[s] upon
the political vicissitudes of the moment”).
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does not even require a majority vote by both bodies.218 Moreover, even if
there were not accountability concerns, allowing the current Executive and
Legislature to undo the work done by a previous Executive and Legislature
simply by declaring that work unconstitutional undermines the fundamental
role played by the judiciary in our constitutional order.219 Even if the
Legislature and the Executive are entitled to their own independent views
on the constitutionality of legislation, their views are not supposed to be the
final ones. Rather, the courts should have the final opportunity to consider
the constitutionality of legislation after full briefing by those who think the
legislation is constitutional, as well as those who do not. Thus, there must
be some mechanism for the defense of statutes in those situations where
neither the current Executive nor the current Legislature supports the
statute.
Indeed, there are numerous examples in the past in which the Senate
has declined to take action after being notified that the Executive would no
longer defend a statute.220 And if the Obama Administration had decided not
to defend DOMA when Democrats still controlled both houses of Congress,
it is entirely possible that neither House of Congress would have elected to
defend the statute. After all, the two Democratic members of the House
Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group voted against directing the House
Counsel to defend the statute, and following that vote, House Minority
Leader Nancy Pelosi sent the House Speaker a letter criticizing the decision
and asking for an accounting of the costs of the House’s involvement in the
litigation.221
Thus, where neither branch is willing to defend the statute, the courts
should appoint lawyers to do so. In such a case, the court-appointed counsel
would represent the United States, just as the Executive Branch or Congress
would have had they decided to defend the law.222 There is little reason to
think that the court will not be able to find attorneys willing to fulfill that
obligation, even when laws are unpopular. Moreover, there is some
218

In the House, involvement in litigation is governed by the five-member Bipartisan Legal
Advisory Group, not the body as a whole. In the Senate, intervention as an amicus is governed by the
body as a whole, but the default is noninvolvement, so no majority vote is required for nondefense. See
Amanda Frost, Congress in Court, 59 UCLA L. REV. 914, 943‒44 (2012).
219
It could also undermine the uniformity of the law if several circuits struck down the law but then
a subsequent president began to enforce the law in those circuits in which it had not been challenged.
220
See Note, supra note 77, at 984.
221
See Lochhead, supra note 54 (“The American people want Congress to be working on the
creation of jobs and ensuring the continued progress of our economic recovery rather than involving
itself unnecessarily in such costly and divisive litigation.” (quoting Letter from Rep. Nancy Pelosi to
House Speaker John Boehner)).
222
To be sure, there may be some awkwardness in the absence of an actual client capable of
providing direction and guidance, but that is also essentially the case when the Executive Branch or
Congress is involved. In those cases, as well, the client is the “United States,” but the United States
cannot provide any specific guidance or direction. In all of these cases, counsel must simply provide
what he or she believes to be the strongest legal arguments in support of the statute’s constitutionality.
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precedent for this approach. As Brian Goldman has written about at length,
the Supreme Court has made a practice of “tapp[ing] an attorney to support
an undefended judgment below, or to take a specific position as an amicus”;
by his measure, it has done so forty-three times since 1954.223 Goldman
argues that although the Court has sometimes used this approach
inappropriately, as a means of reaching out to decide issues that the parties
did not present,224 it is often appropriate for the Court to do this, including
when “the Court has reason to believe that an ongoing controversy exists
notwithstanding a respondent’s failure to appear.”225 The alternative,
Goldman explains, is for the Court to “hear a one-sided appeal.”226 To be
sure, there is a difference between the Supreme Court appointing counsel to
represent a position on appeal and a lower court appointing counsel to
develop the record below, but the point remains that courts sometimes take
more active control over cases to ensure that the relevant issues are
adequately presented to the court for decision.227
And if there is any case in which it is appropriate for the courts to take
a more active role it is surely when there is a valid federal law which the
current Congress and President are unwilling to defend. This is especially
so if the President plans to continue to enforce the law; in such a case, there
is a live controversy between the United States and the individuals who are
subject to that law. The Supreme Court has recognized as much, noting that
“[e]ven [where] the Government largely agreed with the opposing party on
the merits of the controversy,” there could be “an adequate basis for
jurisdiction in the fact that the Government intended to enforce the
challenged law against that party.”228 Even if the President has announced

223

Goldman, supra note 22, at 909. This practice may help prevent Article III problems that could
arise if judicial decisions below were left undefended. Cf. United States v. Providence Journal Co., 485
U.S. 693, 703‒04 (1988) (“[T]he independent ability of the Judiciary to vindicate its authority might
appear to be threatened: both [lower] courts would have agreed that the contemner had disobeyed an
order of the court, but the Executive’s judgment to the contrary would threaten to undermine those
judicial decisions. This threat, however, is inconsequential, for it is this Court . . . that must decide
whether to exercise its discretion to review the judgment below, and it is well within this Court’s
authority to appoint an amicus curiae to file briefs and present oral argument in support of that
judgment.”).
224
See Goldman, supra note 22, at 971 (arguing that in such cases the Court should “adopt a more
minimalist approach,” either denying certiorari or vacating the decision below as moot and remanding to
the lower courts).
225
Id. at 970.
226
Id.
227
Although such active involvement by the court is arguably inconsistent with our adversarial
system’s emphasis on judicial neutrality, it can facilitate other attributes of the adversarial system by
ensuring that both sides of the issue are zealously represented. In the absence of such involvement by the
court, the court will either confront a one-sided presentation of the issue or have to engage in
independent research on its own.
228
See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 940 n.12 (1983) (discussing Bob Jones Univ. v. United States,
461 U.S. 574, 585 n.9 (1983)).
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that he will not enforce the law, there is arguably still a live controversy if
the President’s announcement permits him to change course or if a
subsequent Executive might remain free to renew enforcement based on
past conduct. In such circumstances, the fact that the United States’
traditional lawyers have abandoned the statute’s defense does not mean that
its defense should be abandoned altogether.
C. Objections
As the objections to the Obama Administration’s DOMA decision
make clear, the suggestion that the Executive Branch need not always act
for the United States in court—and, in fact, sometimes should not—is not
uncontroversial. Three objections seem especially likely. First, and most
significantly, opponents might worry that this proposal makes it likely that
the United States’ laws will not be adequately represented. Second,
opponents might worry that this proposal will damage comity between the
branches. Third, opponents might find something troubling in the United
States’ representation by court-appointed private counsel.229
These are legitimate concerns, but in my view ultimately unpersuasive.
Indeed, whether we recognize it or not, the reality is the same: the
Executive Branch is just one part of the “United States” and will not always
be well-positioned to act as simple agent for the whole. Recognizing that
fact does not create these comity and other concerns; rather, it helps address
them by ensuring that where the Executive Branch is not positioned to act,
someone else will.
First, recognizing that the Executive Branch does not have a duty to
defend challenged statutes does not leave United States statutes
undefended. Rather, as I discussed above, recognizing that it does not
always make sense for the Executive Branch to act as agent for the whole
opens the door for others to do so. Whether that responsibility falls to
Congress or to court-appointed counsel, someone will be tasked with
presenting a zealous defense of the challenged statute. Indeed, because the
Executive may not be well-positioned to defend the statute, allowing others
to fill that role may actually result in a more robust defense of the
challenged statute than would otherwise exist.230
Second, former Solicitor General Drew Days has argued that the
Executive Branch’s defense of statutes that are “not patently
229

See Meltzer, supra note 72, at 1209‒20 (providing thoughtful discussion of other potential
problems with executive nondefense, including the “range of considerations that support the practice of
enforcing and defending acts of Congress that the executive branch believes to be misguided, offensive,
and quite possibly unconstitutional—in which category I would place DOMA and Don’t Ask, Don’t
Tell”).
230
See Dellinger, supra note 192 (arguing that the Obama Administration’s decision not to defend
means that “the judges will know to look elsewhere for the most all-out, no-holds-barred defense of the
law in question”).
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unconstitutional but . . . probably unconstitutional” “fosters comity between
the Executive and Legislative Branches.”231 This is certainly true to some
degree, but it is important to consider the countervailing costs to the
effectiveness of our adversarial system and to the ability of both the
Executive Branch and Congress to articulate their own views of the legal
question at issue. Indeed, as previously noted, the Executive and Legislative
Branches will sometimes have different views on legal questions,232 and, as
General Days himself points out, it will sometimes be the case that “an
executive department and an independent regulatory agency are at odds as
to what position should be taken in a Supreme Court case involving other
parties.”233 If such disagreements are inevitable, it is not clear that it will
always promote comity for the Executive Branch to suppress (or, at
minimum, predominate over) the views of the Legislature or independent
agencies. It would seem far better in some circumstances to recognize that
the Executive Branch cannot always act for the whole and to allow many
parties to offer their competing visions of what the Constitution allows and
to let the courts make the final determination.
Third, opponents might find something troubling about private
attorneys defending the laws of the United States. Although the prospect of
private counsel representing the United States may be unusual, it is hardly
unprecedented.234 Private attorneys regularly represented governmental
interests early in the country’s history, and, although less common today,
they continue to play a role in the representation of the United States. In
Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., for example, the Supreme
Court recognized that “[p]rivate attorneys appointed to prosecute a criminal
contempt action represent the United States.”235 Moreover, in qui tam
231

Days, supra note 27, at 502. General Days is, of course, not alone in this view. See, e.g., Dawn
E. Johnsen, Functional Departmentalism and Nonjudicial Interpretation: Who Determines
Constitutional Meaning?, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 105, 126 (2004) (noting that “presidential
practices,” such as “defend[ing] acts of Congress that in their view are unconstitutional, as long as a
reasonable argument can be made in support of the law . . . reflect respect for the Court and Congress
and are consistent with the general separation of powers”).
232
See supra notes 147‒58 and accompanying text.
233
Days, supra note 27, at 496.
234
To be sure, there can sometimes be difficult questions about what actions must be taken by the
United States, as opposed to private parties. See, e.g., Robertson v. United States ex rel. Watson, 130 S.
Ct. 2184, 2185 (2010) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (disagreeing with the court below that an action for
criminal contempt in a congressionally created court may constitutionally be brought in the name and
pursuant to the power of a private person because “[t]he terrifying force of the criminal justice system
may only be brought to bear against an individual by society as a whole, through a prosecution brought
on behalf of the government”). But again the defense of challenged statutes does not involve private
parties acting for the United States as much as providing one view of what the United States’ interests
are in a particular case.
235
481 U.S. 787, 804 (1987) (“A private attorney appointed to prosecute a criminal contempt
therefore certainly should be as disinterested as a public prosecutor who undertakes such a
prosecution.”).
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actions, a private party brings suit in the name of the government to
represent its interests.236 Although the United States is not, strictly speaking,
a “party” to such cases, it nonetheless is a “real party in interest,” and its
interests are thus being represented by a private party.237 Finally, private
attorneys have also been retained to represent both the Congress and the
Judiciary on a number of occasions.238
At the end of the day, the concerns about executive nondefense all
reflect the very reasonable concern that the United States’ laws should be
defended and defended well. The question is simply how best that can be
accomplished. Recognizing that the Executive Branch may not always be
able to serve as a simple agent for the whole suggests that the best interests
of the United States do not always rest in executive defense. Often (and
perhaps even ideally) they will, but where they do not, recognizing the
validity of executive nondefense should harm neither the Executive nor the
United States and should instead help both. It should ensure that the
Executive Branch can represent its own interests and protect its own
integrity before the courts and the public, and it should ensure that the laws
of the United States are represented by those best positioned to do so.
V. BEYOND “DUTY TO DEFEND”
In this Article, I have focused on one context in which the assumption
that the Executive Branch should always act as simple agent for the whole
is, in my view, both well-established and wrong. And it is wrong because it
fails to appreciate that the Executive Branch is no simple agent and that
significant consequences can follow when a part of the United States acts
for the much more complicated whole. But the issues I have discussed in
the context of the Executive Branch’s so-called duty to defend are not
limited to that context. To the contrary, they provide reason to think more
broadly about what it means for the Executive Branch to act as agent for the
whole. The notion that the growth of the administrative state poses a risk of
“systematic departmental self-aggrandizement” is not new,239 but the growth
236

See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(1) (2006) (“A person may bring a civil action for a violation of section
3729 for the person and for the United States Government. The action shall be brought in the name of
the Government.”).
237
See United States ex rel. Eisenstein v. City of New York, 556 U.S. 928, 934 (2009). To be sure,
the Supreme Court has concluded that a “court-appointed prosecutor who sought certiorari and briefed
and argued the case without the authorization of the Solicitor General may not represent the United
States,” United States v. Providence Journal Co., 485 U.S. 693, 695 (1988), but the question would have
been an entirely different one had the Solicitor General authorized the special prosecutor to represent the
United States, as it presumably would in cases where it has waived its right to defend the statute, see id.
at 698‒99.
238
See Providence Journal, 485 U.S. at 712‒13 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (collecting cases).
239
Daryl J. Levinson, Empire-Building Government in Constitutional Law, 118 HARV. L. REV. 915,
953 (2005); see also Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today’s Most
Dangerous Branch from Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314, 2317 (2006) (“[T]he risks of unchecked executive
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of the administrative state is more symptom than cause. Inherent in our
institutional design is the possibility for divergence between those who
make the law and those who execute it, as well as the merger of lawmaking
and law-executing functions in a single branch. Even if checks and balances
were supposed to counteract such risks, they have clearly proven
insufficient in practice.240
There are many contexts in which the Executive Branch purportedly
acts on behalf of the United States, even though other parts of the United
States have a role to play in determining the United States’ substantive
policy positions, and even though there may be significant disagreement
about how the United States should carry out those substantive policy
goals.241 In many of these cases, the Executive Branch will be in some sense
both principal and agent; it will have responsibility for substantive
policymaking, but it will also be acting to effectuate policy goals reached in
part by other components of the government.242

power have grown to the point where dispatch has become a worn-out excuse for capricious activity.”);
Jonathan Macey, Executive Branch Usurpation of Power: Corporations and Capital Markets, 115 YALE
L.J. 2416, 2418 (2006) (“The ascendancy of the executive branch in policymaking is an unintended
consequence of the modern administrative state. The emergence of the executive branch as the fulcrum
of power within the administrative state represents a deviation from the traditional balance of powers
among the three branches of government.”).
240
See, e.g., James A. Gardner, Democracy Without a Net? Separation of Powers and the Idea of
Self-Sustaining Constitutional Constraints on Undemocratic Behavior, 79 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 293, 308
(2005) (“And why have political actors not only failed to resist incursions on their power, but frequently
acquiesced in a diminution of their own authority? Government officers seemingly had at their disposal
all the tools necessary to fight off depredations committed by other branches, yet they chose to
cooperate rather than to resist.”); Katyal, supra note 239, at 2320 (“In most instances today, the only
way for Congress to disapprove of a presidential decree, even one chock full of rampant lawmaking, is
to pass a bill with a solid enough majority to override a presidential veto.”); Levinson & Pildes, supra
note 16, at 2313 (“Few aspects of the founding generation’s political theory are now more clearly
anachronistic than their vision of legislative-executive separation of powers.”).
241
The examples are numerous, if not endless. For example, the Executive Branch generally acts
for the United States in its relations with other countries (both peaceful and otherwise), even though
Congress also has a substantial role to play in determining the nation’s substantive policy in that area
through, for example, its power to declare war and to regulate commerce with foreign nations. The
Executive Branch also, as noted earlier, has exclusive responsibility for enforcing the nation’s laws,
even though Congress clearly has a significant role to play in determining what those laws are. Although
the contexts in which this issue arises are numerous, each one is unique—both in terms of the respective
responsibilities of the branches and the amount of discretion the Executive Branch is supposed to have
in its actions on behalf of the whole.
242
The Executive Branch’s role as agent for the whole is even more complicated when independent
agencies are involved. In such cases, the agency may not require legislative appropriations for its
financing, its top officials may be free from presidential control, and significant portions of the staff may
be appointed independently of both the President and Congress. These independent agencies can
nonetheless wield considerable power. The Chairman of the Federal Reserve, for example, has been
described as “the nation’s most powerful economic policymaking job.” Michael D. Shear & Neil Irwin,
Bernanke to Be Reappointed as Fed Chairman, WASH. POST, Aug. 25, 2009, at A1.
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This duality of the Executive Branch’s role creates the possibility that
the Executive Branch will expand its own powers by purporting to act for
the United States even when it has no authority to do so.243 When
administrative agencies are acting for the United States to determine what
its laws mean (and how they should be enforced), an administrative
agency’s views may vary from what Congress intended when it enacted the
law.244 Or when the Executive Branch is acting for the United States in
hearings before the World Trade Organization and commits the United
States to take certain trade-related actions, the Executive Branch may take a
position with which Congress (which also has a role to play in regulating
our trade with foreign nations245) disagrees.
This possibility for unauthorized executive branch action raises serious
accountability and legitimacy concerns. For example, if the Executive
Branch takes some action abroad, it will generally be viewed as the action
of the United States—and the United States will be held accountable—
regardless of whether any other part of the United States supported the
action. There may also be questions about the legitimacy of the Executive
Branch’s action if it did not enjoy the support of the Legislature or at least
did not follow the proper processes before acting. Consider, for example,
the recent military actions in Libya.246 The fact that the President acted
without congressional consent did not make it any less the action of the
United States in the eyes of the world. The President’s action may or may
not have been lawful—there was apparently disagreement within the
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In 2011, civil war erupted in Libya between supporters of Muammar el-Qaddafi and those trying
to overthrow his government, see, e.g., David D. Kirkpatrick & Mona El-Naggar, Son of Qaddafi Says
Libya Faces Civil War Peril, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 2011, at A1, and controversy erupted in Washington,
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ultimately decided that the United States should intervene in the conflict. See, e.g., David E. Sanger,
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Executive Branch on that very question247—but regardless of its legality, its
significance as an action of the United States is beyond dispute.
In theory, at least, there are checks on unauthorized executive branch
action. For example, the nondelegation doctrine requires Congress to
include guiding principles when it delegates power to administrative
agencies so that there is some limitation on their power to act.248 But even if
the nondelegation doctrine were not essentially a dead letter,249 this check
provides no recourse if the Executive Branch chooses to disregard a
limitation contained in the statute. And although there will sometimes be
opportunities for parties to challenge an executive branch action that is in
tension with a statutory requirement, various justiciability doctrines, which
limit which parties may bring claims in court and what kind of claims they
may bring, mean that just as often there will not be such an opportunity.250
For example, if the Executive Branch initiates military action, there may be
statutes that purport to limit the Executive Branch’s authority in the absence
of congressional consent. But that theoretical check is often meaningless
because, as the prior discussion of political question doctrine revealed,
courts will decline to intervene in such a dispute between the Executive
Branch and Congress.251
Thus, there may be many cases in which existing processes are
insufficient to ensure that, when the Executive Branch is purporting to act
as agent for the United States, it truly is, or in which we improperly assume
247

See Charlie Savage, 2 Top Lawyers Lose Argument on War Powers, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 2011,

at A1.

248

See, e.g., J. W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928).
See, e.g., Patrick M. Garry, The Unannounced Revolution: How the Court Has Indirectly
Effected a Shift in the Separation of Powers, 57 ALA. L. REV. 689, 703 (2006) (“Various scholars have
declared the Non-Delegation Doctrine, which was first announced by the Supreme Court in Field v.
Clark, to be dead.” (footnote omitted)).
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deference doctrines that induce courts to leave much conduct untouched . . . .”); William P. Marshall,
Eleven Reasons Why Presidential Power Inevitably Expands and Why It Matters, 88 B.U. L. REV. 505,
511 (2008) (“Because of justiciability limitations, many of the questions surrounding the scope of
presidential power, such as war powers, never reach the courts.” (footnote omitted)); cf. Richard J.
Pierce, Jr., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife: Standing as a Judicially Imposed Limit on Legislative
Power, 42 DUKE L.J. 1170, 1200 (1993) (noting that the reasoning in the majority opinion in Lujan
“reallocates power among the institutions of government in three related ways,” including by
“confer[ring] on agencies discretion to ignore many congressional policy decisions”).
251
See supra notes 91‒93 and accompanying text; see also El-Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co. v. United
States, 607 F.3d 836, 857 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in the judgment) (“Applying the
political question doctrine in statutory cases thus would not reflect benign deference to the political
branches. Rather, that approach would systematically favor the Executive Branch over the Legislative
Branch—without the courts’ acknowledging as much or grappling with the critical separation of powers
and Article II issues.”). Unsurprisingly, the Obama Administration has argued that a suit filed by
members of Congress challenging the United States’ actions in Libya should be dismissed on political
question grounds. See Memorandum in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss 13‒21, Kucinich v.
Obama, No. 1:11-cv-01096 (RBW) (D.D.C. Aug. 19, 2011).
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that the Executive Branch alone must be the United States’ exclusive agent.
And this is because our failure to appreciate the complexities of the
principal–agent problem in the context of executive branch action leads us
to assume that it is always unproblematic for the Executive Branch to act as
agent for the whole. In the duty-to-defend context, I have argued that the
Executive Branch need not always be the United States’ exclusive agent,
and, in fact, it is better for both the Executive Branch and the United States
if others represent the United States when the Executive Branch has
questions about the statute’s constitutionality.
In other cases, it may be that the Executive Branch should act for the
United States because unity of action is necessary, but we need more robust
means of ensuring that the Executive Branch is truly acting for the United
States and not just for itself. To be sure, there will not always be consensus
among the United States’ competing parts as to any particular substantive
policy goal. But there should be consensus—or at a minimum established
rules—for determining which part (or parts) should have a role in
determining what those substantive policy goals are and what actions the
Executive Branch should take to advance them. And there should also be
some means of ensuring that those rules are followed. For example, it may
be that recognizing these complexities provides reason to rethink
justiciability doctrines, such as political question doctrine, that limit the
ability of the courts to consider congressional challenges to executive
branch action. Or it may be that there are certain contexts in which the
Executive Branch should not be allowed to act in the absence of prior
congressional approval.
Determining all of the various complications of the principal–agent
problem in this context—and determining how those complications are best
addressed—is beyond the scope of this Article. My point here is simply to
point out that the issues I discussed in the context of the Executive Branch’s
duty to defend challenged statutes have implications that extend well
beyond that specific context. Although recognizing the complications that
can arise when one part of the United States acts on behalf of the whole
does not tell us how to deal with those complications—indeed, differences
across contexts make any facile answer impossible—recognizing the
existence of those complications is nonetheless an important first step. We
cannot begin to address the problem until we recognize that it exists.
CONCLUSION
As attractive as the picture of the Executive Branch as a simple agent
may be, that idea is belied by a much more complicated reality, a reality of
multiple principals with different, at times mutually exclusive, interests and
an agent that is at once both principal and agent. This insight provides new
ways of thinking about executive branch action and suggests that it may not
always be possible for one part of the United States to act
1259

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

unproblematically for the whole. That insight may not tell us when it is
appropriate for one part to act on behalf of the whole—or what checks are
necessary to ensure that the part is acting in an authorized manner—but it
does at least ensure that we are recognizing the potential problem and
searching for context-specific ways to solve it.
In this Article, I have focused on one particular context in which the
view that the Executive Branch always can—and should—act as agent for
the whole is well-entrenched and, in my view, wrong: the Executive
Branch’s so-called duty to defend challenged statutes. I have argued that the
Executive Branch should not defend a challenged statute where it has
questions about the statute’s constitutionality. By recognizing that the
United States has many constituent parts that at times have conflicting
interests, it becomes clear that the United States and the Executive Branch
are not one and the same and that sometimes the interests of both are better
served by executive nondefense, rather than defense. By recognizing that,
we can ensure that whatever entity represents the United States in court is
truly representing the United States’ interests and not merely its own.
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